Vern Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and Populist) Bankruptcy Scholarship by Skeel, David A., Jr.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2000 
Vern Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and Populist) 
Bankruptcy Scholarship 
David A. Skeel Jr. 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the American Politics Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, 
Legal Biography Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legal Writing and Research Commons 
Repository Citation 
Skeel, David A. Jr., "Vern Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and Populist) Bankruptcy Scholarship" 
(2000). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1349. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1349 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
VEF\N CO UI\ lTRYiViAN AND TH E PATH OF PROGRE SSIVE 
(AND PO PUUST) BANKR UPTCY SCHOLARSHIP 
Darid A. Sheel, Jr. • 
INTRODUCTION 
The prorr: in:::nt la-vvyer and fo rmer Yale law professor John Fran k 
re1ls of Vern C oun trym an's involvement in the case that even tual] ; be-
cam;:: GYiswold 'V . Connecticut .1 In Griswold , as most readers w ill ::.-e-
call, the Supre1T1e Court struck down a Connecticut statute that pro-
hibited the sale or use of contraceptives . According to J ustice 
Douglas 's m ajority opinion , the statute violated the defendan ts' consti-
t utional right to privacy. Douglas located this new right not in an:,· 
specific consti tutional p rovision but in the "penumbra" of several pro-
visions. To challenge the statute, someone had to go out and buy con-
traceptives. As F rank recounts, Countryman was the one who ini tia lly 
volunteered: 
[T]o create a test case, Vern bought some standard contraceptives at a 
V/algreen 's drug store in New Haven. Alas, he discovered that the store 
was not a great national corporation as he thought; it was simply a fran-
ch ise operation [that is, Walgreen's stores were run not by Walgreen's it-
self, but by individuals who managed a particular store under a fran chise 
ag;-eement with Walgreen 's] and any charge of illegality would have been 
against the poor feiiow who operated the store. Vern did not wa nt a test 
case badly enough to victimize an individual and the effort was aban-
doned. 
To :r.nost b<:mkruptcy scholars of recent vintage, Countryman 's in-
volvem ent in one of the most celebrated civil liberties cases of the cen -
tury would come as a mild surprise. Countryman is remembered as a 
towering figure in bankruptcy.3 (L iterally, as well as figuratively: as 
another pro:minent friend has noted, "Vern was a big man , tall, 2.nd 
'' Professor of La\v, University of Pennsylvania. I am grateful to Bill Draper a t the Biddle 
Law Lib rary of the Un ive rsity of Pennsyh'ania Law Sc hool for help in locati ng sources a nd as-
sem bling research; to Douglas Baird , Kate Heidt, Eric Posner, and Bo b Rasmusse n for valuab le 
comments; and to the University of Pen nsylvania Law Sc hool for ge nero us summer funding. 
I .)81 U. S. 47 9 (1965). 
2 Gerald K. Smith , Vem Co untryman , NORTON BANKR. A DVISER, June 1999, a t 2 , 5 
(quoting John Fran k). 
3 Se e, e.g., N ick Ravo, Obitua ry, Vem Countryman, 81, P1·ojessor and Commerc ial Law Ex-
f>nt , :,;.v. Tn·IES, l'day li , 1999, at A19. 
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with chiseled features and a hard chin. "4 ) If bankruptcy scholars 
playing a word association game were asked what '.vord s carne to 
mind when they though t of Vern Countryman, nearly every one vvould 
respond w ith the same two words: executory contracts. In 1973, 
Countryman wrote an article concluding that a contract should be 
viewed as exec utory (a designation that has enormous consequences in 
the technical world of bankru ptcy)5 when the obligations o:f both par-
ties are "so far unperformed that the failur e by either to cortlp1ete per-· 
formance would constitute a material breac h. "6 \iVith its chara.cteristic 
combination of scholarly ins ight and painstaking doctrin 2cl analysis, 
the article almost immediately took on a life of its O\Yn . E -·/ en more 
remarkable for the merc urial world of bankruptcy scholarship, t he ar-
ticle con tinues to exert influ ence more than two decades later. Dozens 
of judicial opinions and numerous law review a rti cles have p aid hom-
age to the "Countryman definition" of executory contrac ts.' 
If bankruptcy scholars would be mildly surprised to learn that 
Countryman participated in the Griswold case, then the eyes of m any 
would open sti ll wider (as mine did) on hearing about the not-so-secret 
events of Countryman's early career. As an assistant professor at Yale 
Law School in the rgsos, Countryman actively and publicly assisted 
the defendants in several of the loyalty cases brought aga inst individu-
als suspected of Communist sympathies.8 Countryman not only par-
ticipated in individual cases, he also authored a book and several arti-
cles on the loyalty issue. 9 When Countryman was passed over for 
tenure at Yale, he and many others believed that his activism in the 
loyalty cases was the real reason. Undaunted, Countryman remained 
a fervent activist on civil liberties issues throughout his long career, 
which included a stint in private practice and the deanship at the Uni-
versity of New Mexico School of Law before he joined the Harvard 
Law School faculty in 1964 . 
Al though new bankruptcy scholars might be surprised to learn of 
Countryman 's involvement in civil liberties issues, upon refl ection they 
should find the Griswold anecdote completely in character. The most 
4 Smith , supra note 2, at 2 (q uoting Professor Charles Alan Wright). 
5 Under current law, if a cont ract is executory, the debtor 's trustee may re in state the contrac t, 
eve n if the debtor defaul ted prior to bankruptcy. See II US.C. § 365 (1994). 
6 Ve rn Countryman, Exec utory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I , 57 Mil'il\'. L. R E V . 439, 460 
(197 3). 
7 For a vivid example , see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory 
Contmcts , 74 lVIIl\"N. L. REV. 227 , 234-39 (1989). 
s These eve nts are d isc ussed in more detail in Par t II.A ., infm. 
9 See \'ER:--! COUNTRY'\IA N , UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIE S I:--! THE STATE OF \V.-\SHI:\"G -
TOK ( I 95 r ). Countryman 's artic les on loyalty issues include Vern Countryman, Th e Stmn ge Case 
of Alge;- Hiss, 63 YALE L._T. 744 (I954) (book rev iew), and Vern Countryma n, Loyalty Test~· for 
Lawyers, I3 LAW. GUILD REV. 149 (1953) [hereinafter Countryma n, Loyalty Tests]. 
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telling detail, that Countryman abandoned his mission rather than 
embroil "the poor fellow who operated the store" in litigation , hints at 
the overriding theme of Countryman's remarkable career as a bank-
ruptcy scholar. Countryman 's passion was to protect the little guy, the 
individual debtor who had run into financial trouble and filed for 
bankruptcy. M any of Countryman's articles advocated reforms that 
would assure greater protection for individual de btors. H e fought 
tirelessly for the interests of de btors in organizations such as the 
American Bar Association and the National Bankruptcy Conferen ce, 
and he was a founding trustee of the N ational Consumer Law Center. 
For years, the Center has given the "Vern Countryman Award" to 
"honor lawyers who have contributed to the rights and welfare of hv.r ·· 
income consumers."10 
Countryman is best known for the passion he brought to personal 
bankruptcy issues, but he al so made important contributions - in-
cluding the "Countryman definition" of executory contracts - in cor-
porate bankru ptcy and other areas. To all of these endeavors, he 
brought the same qualities: a fi erce integrity (which included an oft-
noted tendency "not to suffer fools gladly" and inspired his classroom 
nickname during his many years at Harvard, "Stern Vern"11 ) and an 
absolute commitment to the correctness of the principles in which he 
believed. 12 
Vern Countryman's views on bankruptcy and legal issues place him 
squarely within the progressive tradition in American thought, and it 
is Countryman's role in progressive bankruptcy scholarship that I fo-
cus on in this essay. 
The term "progressive" is used throughout the essay in its broad, 
lay person's sense, to encompass not just the early twentieth century 
political movement that bears this name, but also American populism, 
which arose so mew hat earlier. 13 Scholars who identify themselves as 
"progressive" frequently advocate the use of social data to motivate 
legislative reform, identify with the socially disadvantaged rather than 
10 Ravo, supra note 3, a t Arg. 
11 Smith, supra note 2, at 4 (quoting former student Ken Klee). 
12 An anecdote concerning Richard Nixon hints a t some of these qualities, a s well as Coun-
tryman's political leanings. After Nixon's reelection, Gerald Smith gave Countryman a bottle of 
wine from the inauguration. Countryman's initial response was to refuse to drink the wine. As 
'vVatergate ran its course, however, the wine took on a new meaning. When N ixon resigned, 
Countryman called Smith to say he would drink the wine with great pleasure. See Telep hone 
Interview with Gerald Smith , Lewis & Roca, Phoenix, Ariz. (Feb. 8, 2000). 
13 Populism was characterized by a defen se of farmers and rural interests, and a hostility to-
ward Wall Street and other concentrations of wealth. Progressivism originated in urban areas 
and focused on social reform but shared populism's distrust of Wall StreH. To distinguish the 
general term "progressive" from the political movement, I will capitalize references to the Progres-
sive movement. The best accoun t of populism a nd Progressivism is sti ll RICHARD H OF-
STADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN T O FD.R. (1 955). 
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the elite, and can be found at the liberal end of the political spectrum 
on most issues. Although this essay refers more precisely to populisrn 
or Progress i\·ism where the di stinction is important, the more gener':ll 
term suffices for much of the analysis. 
To illustrate the historical sweep of progressive bankruptcy schol-
arship , the essay begins by briefly describing the work of Country-
man's most prominent predecessor, vVilliam 0. Douglas. Douglas is 2.n 
obvious choice to represent the origin, roughly seventy years ago, of 
progressive ban kruptcy schola rship. Douglas not only was the in teli:::c-
tual fat her of progress ive bankruptcy scholarship, he also serv ed as 
Countryman's principal mentor afte r Countryman clerked ~;vith the 
Justice in the early r 94os. 1-1 For curren t progressive thinking, th e es-
say explores the work of Elizabeth ·warren . \Narren is the mos :~ 
prominent current progressive, and - quite conveniently fo r my chro-
nology - is widely viewed as Countryman's successor as Harvard 's 
reigning bankruptcy authority. 
In between, of course, came Vern Countryman himself. To la;,r the 
groundwork for discussing Countryman 's work and his enormous in-· 
fluence, Part I of this essay considers first the progressives who pre-
ceded and succeeded him, William Douglas and Elizabeth V/arren. 
The juxtaposition sugges ts that the concerns of current progressives 
differ from those of the early scholars in crucial and interesting re-
spects. To see how and why progressive bankruptcy scholarsh ip has 
evolved, the essay turns to Vern Countryman and his era in Part II. 
This Part highlights three important differences between Country-
man 's work and that of Douglas, his mentor: Countryman's emphasis 
on personal rather th an corporate bankruptcy, his close relationship 
with the bankruptcy bar, and his reaction to the emerging lavv a.nd 
economics movement. Part II then shows the continuing prominence 
of these tendencies in current progressive scholarship. Part HI then 
explores the significance of the shift in perspective for the future of 
progressive bankruptcy schola rship .15 
14 Having joined the Sup reme Cou rt in 1939, Justice Douglas was still in his early years on tile 
Cou rt when Co unt ryman arrived in 1942. P rior to his appoin tment, D ouglas had practiced 
briefly for the firm of Cravath, Swaine & M oore in N ew York, taught at Colum bia and Yale Law 
Sc hools, and ri sen to the chair of the Sec uri ties a nd Exchange Com mission. 
15 I should no te at th e outse t that my own bankruptcy sc holarship wo uld not be c haracte rized 
as progressive. My work fits more neatly within the law-and-economics lite ratu re, though I have 
t ried to moonl ight as a progressive from tim e to time. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., l1Ia1'kets, 
Cow-ts. and the Brave New World o( Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. R EV. 465, 503-09 (usi ng 
analysis from Karl Pola nyi 's 1994 book The G1·eat Tmnsfonnation to criticize recen t law-and-
eco nomics p roposals). 
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I. B.-\NKRUPTCY PP OGR ESSIVES THE:'·T AND N Ov\": 
DOTJ-G l , .c\S A. ~D \NARR E N 
The or1g1ns of progressive bank.ruptcy scholarsb.jp date back, to the 
r ise of American legal realisrn in tbe late r92os and early I 9J05. As is 
vvell knovvn) the l-egal realists sought to O\terthro\v the reigning, Lang-
dellian conception of la.w. ;:;ncl w replace it with a more h ighly· con tex-
o!-- , . ..... 1 " ""t---e v- :-. .....-. -- ~'"' ta 1 '1'-J:'J l<! t"~ i- ;{ '-/'"..--.,-1 " a·o~J-""0: r'J C 11 1 6 1 1~ ~-h o rvo··dc o'r- .-. : ,~,..... , .. .l ) -, v \, <J..a . , c:: . ... .!.:_..• -l l l .! lt:.ll 1 ) 1 ._~.! .1'...... ..... ~·- ) ., .!.-::.• ..... c _::. £ 1 -___ .: c . .... !. • Jt . ... .... . :..! ...... l .t ,::, _ O~ .t·~cJ. i_L _~ .... V 
historian of legal rca1isr!:.1 :'ft..l nc ti onalisru . . . refl ected an crtternpt to 
und.erstand lav; in te r~n~.s c.~ :~- i-cs fa.ctual cor1text ar1cl economic ancl soci21.l 
consequences."1 ' 
I-Iard as it is to i rr~ a. gi ~.-Ie n o\-1/, in an era -\·Vhen the 1nost hotly coxl·-
tested issues so often cor~-::. c rr r::·rr.t constitution :::d la\v and otl1e-: l3U~)1i c 
law areas, a disproportio11?.t':: nu.mber of the eariy legal realists estab-
lished their reputations in corpo1·ate and commercial law.18 Among 
this august company, one a.c ade mic tovv·ers above the r est: liVillia.rn 0. 
Douglas . It is no exaggeration to say that, during the decade from 
roughly r928 to 1938, Douglas figured prominently in every significant 
development affecting bankruptcy lavv and bankru ptcy theory. 1 9 After 
moving from Columbia to Yale in I 92 8, as part of the defection that 
shifted the principal address of legal realism from New York to New 
Haven, 20 Douglas ernbarked on the first important empirical study of 
16 In actuality, the origins of iegal realism were more com plicated tha n this explanation sug-
gests. For instance, pre-real ist Progressives such as Roscoe Pound had already cha llenged the 
Langdellian conception when l eg~ll rea li5m emerged. For a more nuanced overview of the inte l-
lectua l history of lega l realism , see Th omas C. Grey, Modem ,!merican Legal Th ought , 10o YALE 
LJ. 493, 493-508 (1996) lre\·iewin g I'\.C: IL DUXBuRY, PATTERNS OF AMERICA!'·; J URISPR1; -
DE NCE (1995)) . 
li LAURA KAL:VIAN , L EG:\L RL\l.IS~,I .-\T YALE: 1927- I96o , at 3 (1986). 
IS Underhill Moore, We sley Sturges, and Kar l Llewellyn all specia li zed in commercial law. See 
generally id. at 20-35 (describing the early legal realists and their meth odology); W ILLIAM 
TWINING, KARL LLEW ELLY>: AND TH E R EALIST MOVEMENT 128-40 (1973) (describing 
Llewellyn 's early work on sal es la'N issues) Much of Jerome Frank 's ~arly work brought the in-
sigh ts of legal realism to bear on corporate law and corpo rate reorganization. For illus t rations of 
F rank's remarkable, and reso lutely legal realis t, ins ights in to corporate bankruptcy, see J erome 
Frank, E pithet ical Jurispmdenc e and th e Work of the Securiti es and Exchange Com miss ion in 
the Administration of Chapt eY X t!( the Ba;zkruptcy Act, rS N.Y.U. L. REV . .) I / (1 941 ), a nd 
J erome F rank, S ome Realistic Rejlectio;zs on S om.e Aspects of C01·pomie Reorganisat ion , 19 VA . 
L. REV. 541 (1933) [hereinafter, Fra nk, S ome Realistic R efl ections]. One of the agendas of this 
essay is to rekindle academic inte re st in the ban kruptcy scholarship of Douglas, Frank, and other 
legal realists. A. re markable am ount of cutting-edge th eory in the rece nt bankruptcy literature 
was prefigured by these scholars' writings in the r 930s. 
19 Nor was Douglas 's influen ce li mited to bankruptcy. He was famously described in the !ate 
1920s as "the outstanding professor of law in the nation." }AMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT 
jOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILUA!\I 0 . DOUGLAS 109 (rgSo) (quoting a statement attri b uted to 
Uni\·e rsi ty of Chicago President Robert Hutchins). 
20 The resignatio ns of Douglas and several other prominent legal realists were prompted by 
the appointment of Young B. Smith rather tha n Herman Oliphant as Dean of Columbia Law 
Schoo l. Robert H utc hins , who was then the Dean of Yale L aw Sc hool, took the opportunity to 
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bankruptcy. Several years later, Joseph Kennedy, the chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), asked Douglas to oversee 
the SEC 's investigation of corporate reorganization practice . Doug-
las's investigation would inspire major reform in 1938 and w ould lead 
Douglas fi rst to the chair of the SEC and tb::n , by 193 9, to the Su-
p reme Court. 21 
Because Douglas 's work played such a dominant wle , virtually d e-
fi ning progressi<.jc bankruptcy theory in the I 930s, his vvritings are the 
:Jbvious starting point for my analysis . T he first section of this Part 
the refore providss a. brief description and interp retation of Douglas's 
perspective on personal and corporate bankruptcy. T he picture that 
emerges derives both from Douglas's empirical 1,vork and theoretical 
writings and from his interactions with other leading theorists. 
T he section that follows skips fon:vard in ti me to the end of the 
twentieth cen tury and considers current progressive theory. Given 
that the current theorists are still actively writing, and history has not 
ye t determined whose insights will endure, it is more difficult to select 
a theorist to complement William Douglas in the progressive line. 
Several scholars might plausibly be described as characteristic of cur-
rent progressive bankruptcy theory. Nevertheless, nearly every bank-
ruptcy scholar I know (including myself) would point to E lizabeth 
Vlarren 's work as most representative of current progressive think-
ing.22 The second section therefore focuses on 'Warren's contributions 
to the bankruptcy literature. 
Although there are important parallels between ·warren 's work and 
D ouglas 's earlier insights, there also are striking differences. By any 
measure , late twentieth century progressive bankruptcy theory differs 
from its antecedents in remarkable respects . Whereas Douglas regu-
larly attacked bankruptcy lawyers , for instance, ·warren and other re-
cent progressives are far more sympathetic to the bar. Douglas also 
lure Douglas and U nderhill Moore to Yale. The best account of these events is KALMA N, supm 
note I? , at 68-78. 
21 Dou glas's SEC career is desc ribed in more detail in Part LA., infra . 
22 The most p lausib le alternative would probably be Lynn LoPucki, who has written widely 
on corpo rate and pe rsonal bankruptcy and conducted a n influ entia l study of large corpora te reor-
ganization s with William Whitford. See, e.g., Lynn M . LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corpo-
l'ate Go·vernance in the Banhuptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly H eld Companies, 141 U. PA. 
L REV. 669 (1993). Another leading progressive , Jay Westb rook, is a frequent co-author with 
Warren and therefo re a lso figures prominently in this essay. Moving beyond mainstream progres-
sive ba nkruptcy sc holarship, th e most prominent femini st (and commu nitari an) has bee n Karen 
G ross, se e KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY 
SYST EM (r 997), a nd David Carlson at times has brought aspects of postmodernism to bea r on 
bankrup tcy theory, see, e.g., David G. Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
134 1, 1389 (1989) (reviewing TH OMAS JAC KSON, TH E LO GIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW (1986)) ("The whole idea of findin g a deep structure in a complicated, historical artifact such 
as the Bankruptcy Code was doomed from the start."). 
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was much more hostile than current progressives to managers' efforts 
to reorganize large corporations. 
The differences in perspective raise an obvious question: Hovv did 
progressive bankruptcy theory move from the concerns of the 1930s to 
the very different concerns of the I ggos? How did progressive theory 
evolve from William Douglas to Elizabeth Warren? I argue in the 
next Part that the answer is simple: Vern Countryman. Countryman's 
work, and the context in which it arose, provides the intellectual link 
between th e insights of the early progressive theorists and th ose of 
their recent heirs. U nderstanding Countryman's influence and his era 
can teach us a great deal about the path of progresstve bankrup tcy 
theory. 
A. Knocking Down Idols: Willimn Douglas 
and Early Progressive Theory 
In an article published some years ago, Steven Winter recounts a 
famous midrash concerning Abraham, the patriarch of ancient Israel.2 3 
Expanding on the biblical account of Abraham's departure from his 
home country, ultimately to found the nation of Israel, the midrash 
identifies Abraham's father as having been a maker of idols - wooden 
or clay statues of false gods. As Abraham grovvs up, he becomes more 
and more skeptical about claims that the idols have magical powers 
until, in a climactic moment, he smashes a row of idols in front of his 
horrified father. 
William Douglas and his fellow legal realists rose to prominence in 
similar fashion, by smashing the idols of existing legal theory. T he 
principal "idol" was the Langdellian approach perfected at Harvard, 
which sought to discover fixed, abstract principles in the existing 
caselaw and to apply these principles in a mechanical fashion to each 
new case. 24 Douglas dismissed this approach as "library law." T he 
"so-called case method," he complained, "grossly oversimplifies and 
distorts the nature of law" by ignoring the "other psychological, politi-
cal, economic, business, social factors" that influence the law and legal 
decisionmaking.25 Only by adopting an inclusive, contextual, interdis-
ciplinary approach, Douglas insisted, could legal scholars achieve ac-
curate and useful insights about any given issue. It was in his bank-
2.l Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal PoweY an d Narra-
tive iv!eaning, 87 MICH . L. REV. 2225, 2226 (1989). The midrashes are a group of Jewi sh com-
mentaries speculating about aspects of the Hebrew Sc rip tures. The Biblical accou nt of Abraham 
occurs in the book of Genesis. 
24 For an influential recent analysis of this approach, see Thom as C. Grey, Langdell's Qytlzo -
doxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. I, I r (I 983). 
25 WILLIAM 0. DO UGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 280 (1940) (quoted wi th a pp roval 
in J e rome Frank , Democracy and Finance, 54 HARV. L. REV. 905, 908 (1941) (boo k review)) . 
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ruptcy scholarship that Douglas sought most fullv to put these com-
mitments into practice. 
Bankruptcy law as Douglas found it looked quite different from the 
insolvency framework that we now have. Under current law, almost 
every bankruptcy involving an individual, partnership, or corporation 
is included within a single statute. In the late rg2os, by contrast, 
bankruptcy law was divided into two very different legal regimes, one 
for small debtors and the other for large-scale corporate reorganiza-
tion. If an individual or small business encountered financial difficul-
ties, it invoked the first of these regimes, the Bankruptcy Act of r8g8, 
which \Vas the nation's first permanent bankruptcy law. 26 Under the 
relatively simple procedures of the r8g8 Act, an individual who filed 
for bankruptcy w·ould turn over his assets to the bankruptcy court, 
and a trustee would then sell the assets for the benefit of the debtor's 
creditors. Then, as now, individual debtors were not required to give 
up all of their assets, however. Under the laws of each state, certain 
kinds of property were exempt and thus unavailable to creditors; the 
list usually included items like household goods and property that were 
essential to a debtor's livelihood. The r 8g8 Act permitted debtors to 
exempt any property that was protected by the exemption laws of the 
debtor's state. In return for giving up his nonexempt assets, the debtor 
received a discharge from his existing obligations - that is, the exist-
ing debts were voided. 27 In its original incarnation, the r8g8 Act did 
not offer a rehabilitation option designed for individuals. Not until the 
1930s did bankruptcy law give debtors a choice between straight liq-
uidation and proposing a rehabilitation plan. 
The r 8g8 Act contemplated that, as with individual debtors, most 
business debtors would have their assets liquidated and then distrib-
uted to creditors. The r8g8 Act did provide a limited reorganization 
option. Under the Act's "composition" provision, a business debtor 
could restructure its unsecured debt - obligations that were not col-
lateralized by some or all of the firm's property - if a majority of un-
secured creditors voted to accept the restructuring. 28 This provision 
26 Act of July I, I898, ch. 54 I, 30 Stat. 544 (1899). For a detailed account of the political ori-
gins of the I898 Act and the reasons that it survived, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 
r8g8 Bankruptcy Act, IS BANKR. DEV.]. 32I (I999). Provisions of the current Bankruptcy 
Code, Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at I I U.S.C 
~§ IOI-I330 (I994)), which was enacted in I978, will be cited hereafter as sections of the "Bank-
ruptcy Code." Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of I898 will be cited as sections of the "Bank-
ruptcy Act." 
27 In addition to exemptions and the discharge, a third crucial feature of personal bankruptcy 
was and is the trustee's preference powers. To prevent some creditors from enjoying special 
treatment, bankruptcy's preference provisions permit the trustee to retrieve payments and other 
transfers made to creditors shortly before bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Act§ 6o. 
28 See Bankruptcy Act§ 12. 
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was almost useless for large corporate deb tors, however, beca use the 
principal obligations of railroads and other large corporations were se-
cured, as noted below, and the Act did not allow restructuring of se-
cured debt. Even for sm all corporations, the value of the reorgan iza-
t ion option was limited .29 T he assets of most bankrupt businesses -
like the assets of ind ividual debto rs - were simply liquidated. 
Well before the r8g8 Act, Wall Street in ves tment bankers and the ir 
lawyers had created a ve ry cli fie rent regime for addressing the fina n-
cia l distress of large corporat ions, which , in the nineteenth centu ry, 
usua lly were railroads. \Vhen numerous railroads failed in the nine-
teenth century, the bankers and the ir lawyers persuaded courts to re-
structure the railroads through a device tha t became known as an "eq -
uity receivership."30 Most large railroads had raised cash by se ll ing 
stock a nd one or more classes of mortgage bonds - obligations that 
were secured by property of the railroad - to numerous outside, or 
"public," investors. If the r ailroad defaulted, a friendly creditor (usu-
ally one whom the managers themselves had handpicked) would put 
the ra ilroad into receive rship and ask that the firm's assets be sold in a 
foreclosure sale . Meanwhile, the banks that had served as the ra il-
road 's underwriters when a class of stock or bonds was first sold 
would form a committee - called a "protective committee"- to nego-
tiate on behalf of the widely scattered investors who held that class of 
securities. To establish a committee, the banks that had sold the 
stocks or bonds would ask investors to "deposit" their securities with 
the incipient committee . An inves tor who agreed to this arrangem ent 
signed a deposit agreement that gave the committee the right to accept 
or rej ect a proposed restructuring plan on her behal f.3 1 Once the 
committees were in place, their representatives negotiated the term s of 
the restructuring with the railroad's managers. The firm was then re-
organized through a "sale" to its existing creditors. In reality, the "sale" 
29 T he composition provision a lso req ui red that the debtor make its priority payments in cash 
at the tim e the reorganization was confirm ed. See H. R. REP. No. 75 -1409, at 48-49 (1937) . 
Small corporations found sati sfying this requirement difficult. 
30 The emergence of the equity re ceivership procedure to reo rganize the nation's first large 
corporations that failed, the railroads, is one of the great sto ries of Ameri can lega l inge nui ty. I 
have described the history in detail elsew here. See David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolu t ionary Theoyy of 
CoYpomte Law and Corpo·mte Bankmptcy, 51 \'AND. L. REV. 1325, 1353- 58 (1998). F or an ex-
tensive overview of the rece ive rship process by a leader of the reorganization bar, see Pau l D. 
Cravath, Th e R eoYganizat ion of C orpomtions: Bondholden' and S tockholdeYs ' PYotective Commit-
tees; R eorganization Committees; and th e Voluntary R ecapitalizatio n of C01·pomtions, in SO?vlE 
L EGAL P HASES OF CORPORATE FIN".\1'\C ING , REORGAN IZATION AND REGULATIO!\" 153 
(19I/). 
3! In theory, anyo ne co uld form a stock holder ·Or bondholder committee. A ltho ugh outsiders 
sometimes established competing committees, the underwrite r for the securities had an enormous 
ad van tage because it already had a list of a ll th e investors. 
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simply reflected the terms to which the parties had agreed in their ne-
gotiations. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the same Wall Street profes-
sionals who dominated the issuance of securities to public investors -
J. P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, and a small 
gro up of other investment banks, together with their attorneys - were 
also the principal players in nearly every major reorganization. As I 
describe below, thi s Wall Street hegemony triggered a sharp backlash 
in the 1930s. For present purposes, the importan t point is that la rge-
scale reorganization developed in the courts, entirely ou tside the con-
fin es of the I 898 Bankruptcy Act. 
D ouglas 's work took him deeply into both the general bankruptcy 
prac tice governed by the I 898 Act and large-scale reorganization . H is 
first major project, which he began in 1928, focu sed on b ankruptcies 
arising under the I 898 Act and illustrated the realists' preoccupation 
w ith empirical investigations.32 Douglas complained that, although it 
was obvious that many different factors contributed to financial dis-
tress, most observers were "content to leave the problem there."33 
Douglas decried this passivity as inadequate and outmoded. "[T ]hose 
who are interested in social reform and those who are interested in 
problems of social causation," he insisted, must "go further."3 4 By 
"tracing the social, economic and legal antecedents, and by estimating 
the causal processes," investigators could produce "results of tremen-
dous practical and scientific significance."3 5 
To remedy the lack of empirical data on bankruptcy, D ouglas em-
barked on a remarkable study of bankruptcy cases filed in N ew J ersey 
from 1929 to 1930 and in Boston from 1930 to 1931.36 Working with 
bankruptcy and district court judges, as well as the Department of 
Commerce, Douglas and his researchers conducted extensive inter-
views with hundreds of debtors and assembled case files on a total of 
rsoo bankruptcies. Based on this data, Douglas explored a wide range 
32 For an extensive history of legal realist empiricism and an ex ce llent, often critical disc ussion 
of Douglas 's bankruptcy study, see John Hen ry Sc hlegel , AmeYiwn Legal Realism and E mpiYiw l 
Social Science: Fm m the Yale ExpeYience, 28 B UFF. L. RE V. 45 9 (1 979). 
33 William C lark, William 0. Douglas & Dorothy S. Thomas, Th e Business Failure s Project 
-A Pmblem in 1Vlethodology, 39 YALE L.J. ror 3, ror3 (1 930). 
34 !d. 
35 !d. 
36 The arti cles that emerged from this proj ect include C lark, Douglas & Thomas, supm note 
33; William 0. Douglas & Dorothy S. Thomas, Th e Business Fai/u yes Project - I I. An Analysis 
of iv!ethods of Inves tigat ion , 40 YALE L.J. 103 4 (1931); William 0. Douglas & J. Howard Mar-
shall , A Fac tual Study of BankYuptcy Admin istmtion and Some S uggestions, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 
25 (193 2); Willi am 0. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankrupt cy, 41 YALE L.J. 32 9 (1932) 
[hereinafter Douglas, Some Functional Aspects ]; and Willia m 0. Dou glas, Wage Eamer Bankrupt-
cies - State vs. Fedew l Control, 42 YALE L.J. 591 (1933) [hereinafte r Douglas, vFage EarneY 
Bankmptcies]. 
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of issues, including the quality of accounting records kept by small 
businesses that failed and the relationship betvveen automobile acci-
dent judgments, gambling, or extravagant expenditures and bank-
ruptcy filings .J? 
The conclusions that Douglas drew from his study reveal a re-
markably thoughtful vision of the proper role of bankruptcy reform -
one that cannot be described as simply "pro-debtor" or "pro-creditor. ''38 
The common theme in Douglas's findings is an assumption that bank-
ruptcy should be designed to promote self-reliance and industry, and 
should provide a second chance for debtors \Vho fail fo r reasons they 
could not easily have controlled. Douglas worried that credi to rs' ~x­
cessive lending mi~ht be a con tributing factor in the failures of some, 
r) r even many, debtors. "There is . . . a considerable body of opin ion ," 
he noted, "which traces [bankruptcy problems! to the ease with which 
the debtor gets credit."3 9 Debtors' right to file for bankruptcy and re-
quest a discharge was an important corrective to such inappropriate 
credit prac tices . At the same time, Douglas strongly believed that 
many debtors could avoid financial distress if they were encouraged to 
manage their affairs more carefully. Several of Douglas's proposals 
sought, in overtly instrumental fashion, to shape future debtors' be-
havior. For example, Douglas argued that courts should encourage 
businesses to keep adequate accounting records by refusing to di s-
charge debtors that did not. 40 Similar limitations might induce more 
debtors to obtain adequate automobile insurance, and to avoid gam-
bling and excessive speculation.41 
Instead of devising clear rules to achieve these goals, Douglas, like 
many legal realists, was a fervent advocate of judicial and administra-
tive discretion. In his discussion of speculation and gambling, for in-
stance, Douglas insisted: "[An] attempt to treat all cases of speculation 
and gambling categorically would be absurd. It would seem desirable, 
however, to provide administrators with discretionary power so as to 
3i As thi s overview sugge sts, the study was enormously detailed and thus rather in trusive for 
the debtors involved (w ho were under substantial pressure to respond because the study bo re the 
imprimatur of the judge). Douglas's biographer suggests that the methods "would have been on-
erous to the fu ture Ju stice Douglas, who defined the constitutional ri ght of privacy." SIMON, su -
pm note 19, at II3. 
38 For an argument that Douglas 's theoretical conclusions were only loosely tied to his empiri-
cal findings, see Schlege l, supra note 32, at 530- 31. Schlegel argues that Douglas and other early 
legal realists faced a te nsion between their commitment to empiricism a nd their desire to ach ieve 
immediate social reform . On this view, Douglas abandoned hi s empiricism in order to pursue so-
cial change. 
39 William 0. Douglas, Bankruptcy, in ENCY CLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 44 9, 
453 (Edwin RA. Seligman ed., 1937). 
40 See, e. g., Douglas, Some Functional Aspec ts, supra note 36 , at 338- 39 . 
41 See id. at 343 (automobile judgments); id. at 346- 47 (spec ulation and gamblin g). Douglas 
included stock speculation within his definition of inappropriate risk taking. 
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take cognizance of the variants among the cases."42 The principal in-
spiration for Douglas's preferred approach was English bankruptcy 
law:13 Unlike the U.S. law, which contemplated that courts would 
grant (or on rare occasions, deny) a debtor's discharge shortly after he 
filed for bankruptcy, the English approach gave the decisionmaker far 
more discretion. In England, the decisionmaker could delay or impose 
conditions on the discharge rather than give an immediate thumbs up 
or thumbs down - an option English officials exercised more than 
ninety percent of the time.44 The great virtue of adopting a flexible 
approach to discharge, Douglas argued, \Va.s that it would enable the 
decisionmaker to create a solution tailored to th e circumstances and 
needs of the particular debtor. 45 
1..J nderlying all of Douglas's views was the conviction that lcnvmak-
ers should "experiment" and consider radical change where necessary. 
This commitment to experimental reform brought Douglas into direct 
conflict with bankruptcy professionals and the bankruptcy bar. 
Douglas clearly reveled in this role. Speaking to a large group of 
bankruptcy judges46 in 1932, he threw clown the gauntlet, saying, "in 
the immobility of vested interests I have disrespect; and in the lethargy 
and timidity against experimentation I have utter contempt."47 In this 
most inhospitable of venues, Douglas vigorously defended a new bank-
ruptcy bill;18 based largely on English bankruptcy law, that would re-
42 !d. at 347· 
4 .3 See id. at 332-33 ("Exemplary of an administrative flexibility, lacking in our system, arc the 
following discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of England ... "); Douglas & Marshall, 
.wpm note 36, at 35-3 7. 
44 This percentage is determined from statistics quoted by Douglas. See Douglas, Some Func-
tional Aspects, supra note 36, at 334· The English approach dates back to r883 and continues to 
characterize English bankruptcy law today. For a more recent discussion of England's discretion-
ary discharge, sec Douglas G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional, and Suspended Discharges in An-
glo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (rg82). 
4 5 See Douglas, Some Functional Aspects, supra note 36, at 363- 64 (summarizing proposals for 
discretionary discharge). In contrast to his faith that a court or administrator could impose ap-
propriate conditions on a debtor's discharge, Douglas was less sang:1ine about rehabilitation plans 
proposed by the debtors themselves. Douglas worried that "wage earners may well be under 
pressure of creditors to [propose a rehabilitation plan rather than seek an immediate discharge]; 
and [debtors'] excessive optimism may well lead to attempts to do so." Douglas, Wage Earner 
Bankruptcies, supra note 36, at 63 r. Douglas had previously been sympathetic to wage earner 
plans, see Douglas & Marshall, supra note 36, at 49-56 (recommending that wage earner plans be 
allowed as long as they were strictly voluntary), but he apparently had become more skeptical by 
1933, when Wage Earner Bankruptcies was published. 
4 6 Bankruptcy judges were called "referees" until 1973. For simplicity, I will refer to them as 
"judges" throughout the essay. 
4 7 William 0. Douglas, The Hastings Bill and Lessons Leanzedfrom the Bankruptcy Studies, 7 
]. NAT'L ASS'N REF. BANKR. 25, 25 (I932). 
48 The bill - called the "Hastings Bill" - was inspired by the Donovan Report, William ]. 
Donovan, Report of Counsel to the Petitioners, In re Inquiry into the Administration of Bank-
rupts' Estates (S.D.N.Y. 1930), reprinted in ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., IN RE 
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place many of the judicial aspects of U.S. bankruptcy with a more 
administrative approach .49 
Douglas showed no sympathy whatsoever for ban kruptcy lawyers' 
and judges' argument that sweeping change would unsettle more than 
thirty years of established practice. H e told the judges : 
I cannot agree vvith the philosophy of the distinguished committe e of the 
.'\.merican Bar Assoc iation w hen it says that upon the prese nt Bankruptcy 
Act ' has bee n builded a great body of judicial dec is ions w hich n1ust no t be 
destroyed or abando ned in faYor of theoretical or untested inn o\·a ti ons .' 
[\VJh at comme ntary is it on the legal profess ion that we may foi luw our 
an cient ha bits with so much unconcern in face of th e advanceme nt o f our 
knowledge in recent yea rs? Do, [s ic] we want to treat all bankrup ts a like? 
Are we no t interested in whence they come and whither they are going? 50 
Despite Douglas's efforts, the bankruptcy bar managed to fend off 
the administrative reforms. By the end of r 93 2, the Depression had 
deepened, and legislators became more concerned about relief for per-
sonal and corporate debtors than about overhauling the system alto-
gether. Congress did enact significant legislation, but it merely codi-
fied and expanded existing practice.51 
Having conducted a painstaking study of individual and small 
business bankruptcy, Douglas next turned to the other area of insol-
vency law - the reorganization of large corporations . In I934, he 
wrote an important article arguing for a balance between gove rnmen-
tal oversight and private negotiation in railroad reorganization. 5 2 
AD,\IIN1STRAT!ON OF B ANKRUPT ESTATES (1930), and the Thacher Report, S. DOC . NO. 72 ~6 5 
(1932), which called for sweeping bankruptcy refo rm after investigations of exi sting practice. 
Douglas participated in the Donovan and Thacher investigations, and bot h made use of his ban k~ 
ruptcy studies. 
49 See Douglas, supra note 47, at 25- 26. In addition to defendin g the proposed shiit to an au~ 
ministrative approach, Douglas suggested an eve n more radical expe riment: "Why no t aboli sh this 
terrifying Federal beaurocracy [sic] [that is, the proposed ad mini strati ve age ncy] and retu rn the 
power [to re gulate bankruptcy] to the state s? " !d. at 27. Douglas defended hi s provocati ve p ro~ 
posal to let the states regulate personal bankruptcy - a proposal that dese rves far more attention 
than it has bee n given by su bseque nt scholars - at length in an article he pub li shed the same 
year. See Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies , supra note 36. 
50 Douglas, supra note 47, at 26. 
51 Congress codified railroad receivership and provided for sm a ll debtor and farmer rehabilita~ 
tion plans in 1933, a nd codi fi ed corporate reorgani zation (that is, receiverships of large, n o n ~ 
rai lroad firm s) in 1934 . The most important effect of the 1933 and 1934 reform s was to incl ude 
large~scale corporate and rai lroad reorgan ization within the Bankruptcy Act for the first time. 
For a desc ription and political analysis of these reforms, see Skee l, supra note 30, at 1362-68. 
52 S ee Willi am 0. Douglas, Protective Comm itte es in Railmad Reorganizations, 47 HA RV. L. 
REV. 565 (1934). Douglas had a lso conducted a small , ea rlier study of eq ui ty rece iverships in 
Con necticut See William 0. Douglas & John H. Wei r, Equity R eceiversh ips in the United Sta tes 
District Court for Connecticut: I92o- 1929 , 4 CONN. B. J . I (1930). Interestingly, the firms in 
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Douglas advocated a greater governmental role in policing protective 
committee negotiations but rejected an earlier proposal (by another ar-
den t N ew Dealer) for more sweeping governmental controP 3 
I n the same year, Congress enacted legislation instructing the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission to conduct a study of large corporate 
reorganizations.5 -+ That fall, James Landis contacted Douglas at the 
behest of J oseph Kennedy, the first chair of the SEC, and asked 
D ouglas if he would come to Washington to conduct the study. 55 
D ouglas accepted, and he spent the next several years overseeing a 
massive in\·estiga tion of corporate reorganization practice. \Nith an 
equally 1nonu rnental report, Douglas articulated a distinctively pro-
gressive vision for large-scale reorganization, later reflected in the leg-
islation tint it. inspired.56 
Douglas's strategy for investigating corporate reorganization ech-
oed the approach of his earlier bankruptcy study in important respects, 
but on an even larger scale. Douglas and his principal assistant, Abe 
Fortas (a Douglas protege who would later join Douglas on the Su-
preme Court),57 developed an extensive questionnaire to give to the 
bankers and lawyers involved in every significant restructuring case in 
the country. Fortas and other members of the SEC staff, and occa-
sionally Douglas himself, then crisscrossed the country conducting in-
terviews. T hey were appalled by what they found. Because firms' old 
managers usually remained in control, and because firms' bankers and 
lawyers were allied with them, no one had any incentive to investigate 
the possibility that the managers had engaged in fraud or mismanage-
Douglas's Connecticut study were mid-sized rather than truly large scale, and his study reflected 
much less hostility than his subsequent work on corporate reorganization would. 
Throughout this period, Douglas had written a series of important articles on corporate and 
securities law. S ee, e.g., William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, Some Effects of the Securities 
Act upon Investm ent Banking, I U. CHI. L. REV. 283 (I933); William 0. Douglas, A Functional 
Approach to the Law of Business Associations, 23 ILL. L. REV. 673 (I929). 
53 See I'vla.;: Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganization Act, 4 7 HARV. L. REV. IS (I 933). 
54 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-29I, § 2II, 48 Stat. 8SI, 909 (codified 
at 15 U.SC. § 78 (1994)). 
55 See SDION, supra note 19, at I35; James Allen, Introduction, in DOUGLAS, supra note 25, 
at x (quoting TIME, Oct. I I, I93 7). 
56 The report, SECURITIES AND EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INV ESTI-
GATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE c\I\'D 
REORGANIZATION COMl\liTTEES (1936-I940) [hereinafter SEC REPORT] , ultimately grew to 
eight volumes. Douglas later speculated that Vern Countryman was the only person outside the 
SEC who ever read the entire report. See SIMON, supra note 19, at I49 (noting that even Coun-
tryman did not read the report "for bedtime reading but to prepare for his judicial clerkship with 
Douglas"). 
57 As Douglas began the study, Fortas was already working for Douglas's friend Jerome Frank 
at the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. As recounted by Douglas's biographer, "[ w ]hat 
soon transpired was an extraordinary exchange of letters between Douglas and Frank, in which 
Douglas, with an impre5sive combination of audacity, good humor and persistence, wrenched For-
tas away from his protesting employer." SIMON, supra note I9, at I4I. 
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ment.53 M oreover, the vVall Stree t professionals who organized protec-
tive committees in order to negotiate the reorganization seemed to fo-
cus more on obtaining generous fe es for themselves than on striking a 
good bargain on behalf of the scattered investors whom they purported 
to represent.59 The big losers, of course, we re small, individual inves-
tors.60 
To remedy these problems, the SEC recommended sweeping 
changes. To ensure an objective assessment of management, the SEC 
proposed replac ing the managers with an independent trustee in every 
large reorganization case 6 1 T he independent trustee would be 
authorized to run the deb tor's business during the case and would de -
velop a proposed reorganization plan. To eliminate conflic ts of inter-
est, the SEC proposed to prohibit any banker or lawyer that had a 
preexisting relationship with the troubled firm from serv ing either as 
trustee or as the trustee's attorney.6 2 The proposals also w ould pro-
hibit the parties fr om soliciting votes on a proposed reorganization 
plan until after a court approved the plan.63 The overall effec t of 
these proposals would be to shift the focus of reorganization to the in-
dependent trustee and his professionals, and to usher the central play-
58 Concerning bankers a nd manage rs, the report complained: 
Man agements a nd bankers see k perpetuation of [their] control for the business patron -
age it comma nds, wh ich they may ta ke for the mse lves or a llot to others, a s they will. 
They see k, a lso, to perpetuate that control in order to stifle careful scrutiny of the past 
history of the co rporati on. There by, clai ms base d on fra ud or mismanagement a re stilled 
!d. a t 863 
59 Concerning reorgani zation lawyers, the report stated: 
[C]oun se l fees freq uently consti tute the largest sin gle item on the li st of reorgani zati on 
fees. . The vice is that the bar has been charging a ll that the traffic wi ll bear. It has 
forsaken the tradition tha t its me mbers a re office rs of th e court a nd shou ld req uest and 
ex pect only modest fees. 
r SEC REPORT, supra note s6, at S6 i. 
60 Progressive sc holars had been raising these complain ts for years by th e time Douglas and 
his sta ff completed the SEC Report. Most p romine ntly, Max Lowenthal wro te a book- lengt h 
expose of the reorganization of the C hicago, Mi lwa ukee & St. Paul Rai lroad (the ''St. Paul ") that 
decried the domin ation of the process by the Wall Street ba nkers and bar. See l'vl.-\X 
LOWENTHAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933). Interestingly, Douglas himse lf had worked exte n-
sively on the St. Paul case during his brief career as a practic ing lawyer at C ravat h, Swaine & 
Moore . S ee SIMON, supra note 19, at 84- 85 . 
61 The mandatory trustee requireme nt was by far the most cont roversial of the SEC proposa ls. 
For a more detailed discussion of the proposals and the legislative history, see David A. Skee l, Jr., 
The Rise and Fall of the SEC in Ba nkruptcy (Nov. 9, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on fil e with 
the a u thor). 
62 Under the SEC proposals (and, after their enactment in the Chandler Act amendme nts of 
r 938, under the Bankruptcy Act) , both the trustee and the trustee's attorney were required to be 
"disin te rested. " Amendments to the Bankru ptcy Act of r8g8, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. SiS,§ 156, 
52 Stat. 840, 888 (trustee); id. at§ 157 , 52 Stat. at 888 (trustee's attorney). "Disinte res ted " was 
defined explicitly to exclude a ny underwriter of oulstanding securiti es, and any attorney for the 
debtor or its banks. See id. a t § rs8, 52 Stat. at 888. 
63 See id. at§ q 6, 52 Stat. at 891. 
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ers under existing law - managers, Wall Street bankers, and Vvall 
Street lawyers - out of the reorganization process altogether. For the 
deb tors ' managers and their professionals, filing for bankruptcy would 
mean turning over the keys to the SEC, the court, and a trustee. 
As with the general bankruptcy bar in his earlier study, Douglas 
did not hesitate to attack the reorganization bar (and by implication, 
Cravath, his former employer and the leading reorganization firm ): 
The prominence of th e lawyer extends down to the close of reorgan izat ion 
and includes the negotiation and consummation of a plan of reorganiza-
tion. [A]t times the client has abdicate d , so to speak , ka1:ing the lawyer in 
so le command. . . . [T]hcre has been a degeneration of the bar in these situa-
tions. Conflicts of interest have had their corrod in g intluence 6 -l 
Abe Fortas's account to Douglas of a visit lo Fortas's Yale Law 
School reorganization class by Robert Swaine of Cravath, the nation's 
m ost prominent reorganization lawyer, illustrates the depth of the hos-
tility that the SEC report aroused. "Approximately an hour and a half 
was taken up with a defense of himself and an attack of Part I of our 
report," Fortas reported. "[Swaine] assured the boys that Part I desig-
na ted him as a liar and a perjurer; he pointed out the many sections in 
which, according to his interpretation, he was accused of avarice. He 
entered a most vigorous denial to all the charges."65 
As in his work on small bankruptcies, Douglas insisted on the need 
for experimentation and sweeping change. Once again , his emphasis 
was on the importance of the individual: this time, the small investors 
in large, troubled firms. Only by displacing a debtor 's managers with 
an independent trustee, and wresting control of reorganization away 
from Wall Street, could investors' interests be truly protected. In the 
middle of the New Deal, with the weight of the SEC behind him and 
populist antagonism toward Wall Street professionals at high tide, 
Douglas was perfectly positioned to convert the SEC experiment in in-
vestor protection into federal law.66 In r 93 7, the SEC injected its pro-
posals into bankruptcy legislation that had been pending in Congress 
64 DOUGLAS, supra note 25, at 233. During the SEC investigation, Douglas interrogated a ll of 
the most prominent reorganization lawye rs. In his often apocryphal autobiography, Douglas 
claimed tha t after he finished deposing Robert Swaine, his former boss at Cravath , Swaine mar-
veled that Douglas "stood me on my head and shook a ll of the fill ings out of my teeth." 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, GO EAST YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 260 (1974) [hereinafte r, 
DOUGLAS, Go EAST]. 
65 Letter from Abe Fortas to Willi am 0 . Douglas (May 20, 193 7) (on fi le w ith the Library of 
Congress, Douglas Papers, Container N o. 6). 
66 By late 193 7 Douglas had become C hairman of the SEC and had launched a stunningly 
successful effort to reorganize the New York Stock Exchange to better serve investors' in terests. 
H e a lso had become a close advisor to President Roosevelt by this time. See SIMON, supra note 
r 9, at r68-7 5. These deve lopments obviously did not hu rt hi s influence in the bankruptcy reform 
process. 
II 
2000] VE RN CO UNTRYMAN 
for several years . Congress subsequently enacted the proposals, almost 
\·erbatim, as Chap ter X of the Chandler Act of 1938 .67 
To put "William Douglas's bankruptcy legacy into broader context, 
it is important to note that other prominent scholars had differing per-
spectives regarding w hat a progress ive bankruptcy framevvork sh ould 
look like. For personal and small business bankruptcy, several of 
Douglas 's colleagues at Yale proposed different and arg uably more 
d r <~.rrBtic , though related , reforms. Most in tr iguing was \Vesle_y Stur-
ges's call to revamp the commercial law priority fr amework. Und er 
S:.turges 's proposal, ea rlier cred itors would take priority over subse-
y:..:c::1t ones, so that a subsequent credi tor ran the ris k of be ing left \Vi th 
'lO t.h ing if it lent to an overburdened de btor. 6 3 
'' 1 k . • 1 [" . I ' j 1 u n corporate oan ·ruptcy, progress rve scl1o ars c rviacu a ong tile 
same lines as did New Deal theorists in a famous economi c de bate 
during the Roosevelt Administration. 69 Advocates of "competition" 
like Louis Brandeis wanted to destroy big business in order to protect 
local entrepreneurs; they favored Main Street over Wall Street. 70 The 
"planners," by contrast, led by Rexford Tugwell and Adolf Berle of 
Roosevel t 's "brain trust," argued that the consolidation of business ar,d 
the growth of the giant corporations were inevitable. Rather than 
fragmenting business, therefore, the planners wanted to subject it to 
pervasive governmental control.' 1 
Douglas shared Brandeis's emphasis on competition and individual 
initiative, and was sometimes chided by "planners" such as Jerome 
Frank fo r not advocating greater governmental oversight. 72 D ouglas's 
6; :\ct of J une 22 , 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by P ub. L No. 95-598 . 92 Stat. 25 ,19, 
26S2 II 9iSl . Prior to the SEC's in volvement, the Chandler Bill had co nsisted of extensive 
changes proposed by the National Bankrup tcy Confere nce (NBC), a n organization that in clud ed 
th e icacling membe rs of the ba nkru ptcy bar. The SEC dramati cally intervened in late H)36, pro-
posing an entire ly new set of provisions for the reorganization of large corporations. The C han-
dler t\ct reflected a te nse a lliance between the SE C and the NBC, with the SEC dictating the 
te rm s of la rge co rporate reorganizations ("C hapter X") and the NBC influencing the remainder of 
th e ,-\ct. Fo r a more detailed disc ussion, see Skeel, supra note 30, at 1368-72. 
6S S ee Wesley A. Sturges, A Proposed State Collect ion Act, 43 Yc\LE L.]. ross (1934): Wesley 
A. Sturges & Don E. Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies , 4 2 YALE 
L.]. -t87 (1 933). Although he thought th a t Sturges's proposal had limi ta tions, Vern Coun tryma n 
later disc usse d it with ob vious approval. See Vern Countryman, Improvident C1·edit Extension: A 
N ew Legai Co ncept .1boming?, 27 ME. L. REV. r , 6-8 (1975). 
69 F or a good overview of th is debate, see ARTH UR M. SCHLESINGER, JR ., THE CRJSIS OF 
TilE OLD ORDER: 19 ! 9-1 933, at 398- 405 (1957). 
i O Brandeis 's views were best known from his famous book excoriating the ''Money Trust ' ' 
LOUIS D. BRA:'-JDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 5 (I9f4). 
il See SCHLESING ER, supra note 69, at 399-405. 
i2 Com menti ng on Douglas's suggestion in his railroad reorganization arti cle that the parti es 
rath er tha n a governmen t agen cy should develop the terms of reorganization , F rank responded: 
I am not thoroughly con vin ced that the tec hnique you advocate is the best one . If the 
[I nte rstate C om merce] Commission has too many du ties to permit it to undertake, on its 
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SEC proposals called for much more aggressive reform than he had 
advocated earlier, and can be seen as responding in part to these criti-
cisms. Yet as radical as the SEC proposals were, they nevertheless as-
sumed that private parties (principally the independent trustee) would 
run the reorganization process. Douglas's vision for progressive re-
form meant breaking the grip of the Wall Street bankers and lavvyers 
and protecting investors - not direct governmental control. 
Even after joining the Supreme Court in I 939, Douglas pursued his 
progressive approach to bankruptcy. In two early opinions, Douglas 
held that the Chandler Act and the ccrporate reorganization provision 
it replaced prohibi ted confirmation of a reorganization plan unless it 
complied with the absolute priority rule. 73 Under the absolute priority 
rule, lower priority creditors and stockholders cannot receive anything 
in a reorganization unless senior creditors are paid in full.' 4 W hereas 
the reorganization bar had long insisted that flexible priority rules 
were essential to the reorganization process/ 5 Douglas and other pro-
gressive scholars believed that strict enforcement of the parties' priori-
ties provided crucial protection for junior creditors. 76 Absent absolute 
priority, senior creditors and shareholders could enter into collusive ar-
rangements that preserved an interest for shareholders at the expense 
of junior creditors. 77 By construing ambiguous language that ap-
peared both in the I 938 Chandler Act amendments and in prior law as 
own, the formation of a Plan, then it seems to me some agency or agencies should be set 
up with all the powers that you advocate. 
Letter from Jerome Frank to William 0. Douglas (Jan. 19, 1934) (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, Douglas Papers, Container No.6). 
73 See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. sro, 527 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles 
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. ro6, r 19 (1939). 
74 For a detailed discussion of the absolute priority rule and its history, highlighting the roles 
of Douglas, Jerome Frank, and Robert Swaine, see Douglas Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, 
Boyd's Legacy and Blackstone's Ghost (Dec. ro, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Harvard Law Review). 
75 See Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last 
Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 911-23 (1927). Among other things, flexible priority rules, 
which became known as "relative priority," permitted shareholders to participate rather than have 
their interests cut off in favor of higher priority creditors. Shareholders often were an important 
source of new capital, and because the firm's managers often held stock, relative priority also gave 
them an incentive to facilitate the reorganization process rather than to resist it. 
76 See Frank, Some Realistic Reflections, supra note rS, at 566-69. 
77 The collusion could take a variety of forms. Senior creditors might agree to a restructuring 
pursuant to which the old shareholders acquire the firm at the foreclosure sale in return for a cash 
contribution, but junior creditors receive neither the right to contribute nor any payment. The 
risk to junior creditors was magnified by the artificial nature of the sale. Because outside bidders 
rarely appeared, managers and senior creditors had significant flexibility in valuing the firm's 
assets. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 74, at 14-17; Frank, Some Realistic Reflections, supra 
note rS, at 553-55· 
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adop ting a firm commitment to absolute priority/ 8 Douglas reinforced 
the progressive vision of corporate reorganization that Congress had 
enac ted in 1938. 79 
B. Progressive Bankruptcy Th eory Today: Elizabeth Warren 
Sixty years after Douglas joined the Supreme Court, scholars con-
t inue to debate many of the same issues tha t preoccupied him and 
other progressives in the r 930s. Foremost among the current progres-
sives is E lizabeth Warren. Like Douglas, Warren decries the dearth of 
empirical data and insists on the need both to fill this gap and to usc 
empirical work to inform an agenda for constructive change. In words 
that echo Douglas's approach, she proclaims that "a debate without 
data is a useless exc ursion, a trip from nowhere to nowhere."80 As 
simila r as Warren 's commitments are to those of Douglas and the early 
progressives, they also di ffer in intrigu ing respects.8 1 
E lizabeth Warren is best known for an extensive study of personal 
bankruptcy that she conducted with Theresa Sullivan and Jay West-
brook, which led to their 1989 book As We Forgive Our Debtors.82 
Since William Douglas's landmark investigation of small business and 
personal bankruptcy in the I9JOS, there had been only a few large-
scale empirical efforts to investigate personal bankruptcy. The most 
influential of these was a Brookings Institute study that figured 
prominently in the debates that led to the I9i8 Bankruptcy Code.83 
Warren and her co-authors embarked on an even more extensive study, 
in their words "the largest study of consumer debtors undertaken in 
78 The amendments required that a reorganization plan be "fair and equitable. " Chandler Act 
of 1938 , ch. 575, § 221(2), 52 Stat. 840, 897 (codified as amended at r r U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1994)). 
Douglas treated this language as a shorthand reference to th e absolute priority rule. 
79 The progressives were not the only sc holars writing abo ut bankruptcy law, of course. Other 
sc hola rs, the most prominent of whom was James McLaughlin of Harvard, wrote in the doctri-
na list tradition. Along with a small gro up of bankruptcy lawye rs a nd academics, McLaughlin 
helped to found the National Bankruptcy Confere nce in 1932. He was the leading doctrina l 
scholar, a nd a fi xture at congressional hearings on bankruptcy from the 1920s to the 196os. For 
a n illustra ti ve early a rticle, see Ja mes A. McLaughlin , Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act , 40 
HARV. L. REV. 341 (1927). Al though the interests of these sc holars a nd Douglas 's SEC inter-
sected briefly in their combined efforts to promote bankrup tcy re form in 1938, the progressives 
a nd doctrina lists otherwise had li ttle in common. The doctrina lists were traditional and conser-
vati ve, w hereas the progressives too k a passionate interest in expe rimentation and change . 
so Elizabeth Warren & J ay Lawrence Westbrook, Searching for R eorganization Realities, 72 
W ASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1258 (1994). 
81 In addition to the distinctions that I note in the text, Wa rre n can be see n as populist in ori-
entation, whereas Douglas's views have more in common with the P rogressive movement. 
82 TERESA A. SULLIVA N, ELIZABETH W ARRE N & J AY LAW RE NCE WESTBROOK, AS WE 
FORGIVE OUR D EBTORS: BAN KRU PTCY AND CO NSUMER CREDIT IN Al\IE RICA (1989). 
83 DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BA NKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, RE-
FORM (197 1). 
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the United States."84 Based on the information that debtors must pro-
vid e vvhen they file for bankruptcy, Warren and her co-authors studied 
a total of 1,547 cases filed in rg8r in ten di stricts scattered throughout 
Texas, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. 85 
In As lVe Forgive Our Debtors, Sullivan, \Varren, and ·westbrook 
provide a detailed profile of U.S. bankruptcy debtors and their finan -
cial condition when they filed for bankruptcy. Some of the authors' 
findings are unsurprising: for example, individual s who file for bank-
ru ptcy in thi s country tend to have more debt a nd less income than 
those who do not.86 Less obvious is the study's findin g that debtors do 
not come disproportionately from low-pay, lo\v-prestige occupa tions . 
To the contrary, debtors look much like everyone else, suggesting that 
layoffs or other job disruptions may be the principa l reason for their 
much lovver income.8 7 
Throughout their analysis, Warren and her co-authors pay par-
ticular attention to issues involving debtors ' decisions whether to seek 
an immediate discharge under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or to 
propose a three- to five-year rehabilitation plan under Chapter 13.88 
Commentators and creditor groups have long contended that too few 
debtors choose the rehabilitation option. Many debtors who obtain 
immediate discharge, they argue, could pay their creditors more if they 
proposed a rehabilitation plan instead. Creditor groups have argued 
vehemently since the rg6os that debtors who are capable of repaying 
some of their debt over time should be forced into Chapter r 3.89 
In As We Forgive Our Debtors and elsewhere, Warren sharply criti-
cizes the credit industry 's proposals for steering more debtors into 
Chapter 13. Warren and her co-authors point out that a substantial 
percentage of debtors who do embark on repayment plans are unable 
to complete them. 90 Although a prominent study sponsored in part by 
84 SULLIVAN , WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 82, a t q. For a detailed description of 
the study and its methodology, see id. at 17-1 9. Unlike Douglas, Warre n and her co-authors re-
lied for their study on filing data rather than on interviews with deutors. 
ss See id. at q-18. 
86 See id. at 65 . 
87 See id. at 84-105 
SS See id. a t 208. Congress added the second option, which was traditionally known as a 
"wage earner p lan," in 1938. For a description of this deve lopment, see H.R. REP . .:\0. 7 5-1409, 
at 52 - 55 (1937). Although this approach delays a debtor 's discharge , lawmakers be lieved it would 
red uce the stigma of bankruptcy. If debtors committed to continue paying for seve ral m ore years, 
lawmakers reaso ned, they and their credi tors would be less likely to vie w bankruptcy as aban-
doning their obli gations. To reinforce this perception, deb tors wh o sought a n immedi ate dis-
charge were referred to as "bankrupts" until 1978 , whereas t hose who proposed a rehabili tation 
plan were called "de btors." 
89 Fo r a brief, condemnatory overview of the creditor gro ups' position, see Vern Countryman, 
Bankmptcy and the In dividual Debtor - And a Modest Proposal to R et um to the S e-uenteenth 
Centm·y, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 821 -26 (1983). 
90 See SULLIVAN , W ARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 82, at 220-23 . 
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the credit industry concluded that Chapter 7 debtors could pay off 
more th an four billion dollars of debt if they used Chapter r3, Warre n 
and her co-authors dismiss the findings as unreliable. 9 1 
\Var ren and her co-authors are simila rly skeptical of claims that 
deb tors could be encouraged to choose the repayment alternative 
rather than immediate discharge if lawmakers made adjustments such 
as reducing debtors' exemptions.92 In both her co-authored and solo 
work, Warren rejects the suggestion that debtors will respond in a 
simple. predictable way to changes in the bankruptcy laws. "This 
prem ise [that reducing exemptions will cause more debtors to choose 
Chapter r3] ," she argues, "calls to mind thousands of almost-bankrup t 
rational maximizers sitting anxiously on some hypothetical cost/benefit 
curve, waiting for the numbers to come down from Congress."93 The 
reality is much more complex and, in fact, existing data cast serious 
doubt on the contention that exemptions can be used to shape debtor 
behavior.94 
As thi s overview suggests, the policy proposals of As We Forgive 
Our Debtors are principally negative in form: lawmakers should pre-
serve the current framework and protect debtors rather than accede to 
creditors' cries for reform. 95 
9! In a n earlier a rti cle, Warren and he r co-a uthors subjected the study {kn own as the "Purdue 
Study," based on the unive rsity affiliation of its authors) to withering sc rutiny. See Teresa A. Sul-
livan, Eli zabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Limiting Access to B ankruptcy Discharge.· 
An Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1091. They concluded: 
The Study lacks crucial expe rti se, is designed incorrect ly, asks a series o f inartful ques-
tion s, gathers its data imprope rly, misanalyses the statistical data and draws erroneous 
and biased infe rences from the data analysis. M oreover, error after e rror increases the 
co unt of the debtors w ho "co uld pay" a nd the amount of the deb t that co uld be recov-
ered 
!d. at r 145 . 
92 The theo ry was that if Congress diminished deb tors ' exemptions, debto rs would be unabl e 
to p rotect the ir property a nd sti ll receive an imm ediate discharge . If th e exemptions were too 
sm a ll to protect important property, and debtors wanted to kee p t he property, they would need to 
fil e under C hapter 13. In Chapter 13, deb tors co uld propose a rehabilitati on plan that promised 
ongoing payments to creditors while permitting the debtors to keep their property. In C hap ter 7, 
on the other hand , nonexempt property would be sold and the proceeds distributed to creditors. 
For a ge neral discussion of exemptions, see p. 1082. 
9.3 Eli zabeth Warren , Reducing Bankruptcy Prot ection for Consumers: A Response, 72 CEO. 
L.J. 1333, 1343 (!984), 
94 See id. at 1344-45 (citing evidence that a disp roportionate percentage of debtors in Texas 
choose Chapter 13 , despite hi gh exe mptions, and that lowe r exemptions d o not dec rease bank-
ruptcy filin gs); see also SULLIVAN, WARREN & WE STBROO K, supra note 82, at 19-20 (suggest-
in g that the a uthors' data cast doubt on the assumpti on in the 1984 amendments to the Bank-
rup tcy Code that altering the statu te would influence debto rs ' filing decisions). 
95 See SU LLIVA N, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 82, at 339-41 (sum marizin g conclu-
sions) . Warren and her co-authors have revisited their findings in a new study. Their preliminary 
a nalysis confirms the ge neral conc lu sions of As We Forgive Our Debtors. See Te resa A . Sullivan, 
E li zabeth Warre n & J ay Lawrence Westbrook, Consumn Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial 
CompaYison of Consumer Bankrupts I98I-I99 I , 68 AM. BA N KR. L.J . r2r, 125 (1994). 
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vVarren 's work on personal bankruptcy marks her as an obvious in-
tellectual heir of William Douglas, yet it also reveals subtle differences. 
As noted above, the most obvious kinship between Douglas and War-
ren lies in their shared commitment to empirics. Both insist that re-
form must be grounded in careful attention to empirical data. vVhen 
Warren emphasizes (in another context) that her policy analysis "takes 
its cue from the tradition of legal realism, asserting that real-world 
constraints necessarily - and properly - bind bankruptcy policy, and 
that only in a specified factual context does a policy discussion become 
meaningful,"96 it is hare! not to think of William Douglas. Yet V!arren 
is far less sympathetic than Douglas to using the law instrumentally, 
especially when the aim is to shape debtors' behavior. 
The question whether debtors should receive an immediate dis-
charge nicely illustrates these similarities and differences between 
·warren's and Douglas's work on personal bankruptcy. Douglas criti-
cized the immediate discharge, and contended that courts should be 
permitted to postpone or condition the cancellation of a debtor's obli-
gations. Both Douglas's urge to experiment and his interest in mold-
ing debtor behavior stand in contrast to Warren's reluctance to tinker 
with the bankruptcy discharge. 
Like Douglas in the I 930s, Warren turned her attention to debates 
about corporate reorganization after writing As We Forgive Our Debt-
ors, although she has continued to devote considerable energy to per-
sonal bankruptcy issues. Douglas was thrown headlong into corporate 
reorganization by Congress's call for the SEC to investigate reorgani-
zation practice. For Warren, as for other recent bankruptcy scholars, 
the pivotal event was the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. 
The Bankruptcy Act had imposed rigid requirements on the reorgani-
zation of large, publicly held corporations. 97 In addition to the manda-
tory trustee requirement and the exclusion of a debtor's bankers and 
attorneys, the chapter for large debtors also required strict compliance 
with the absolute priority rule. 98 As noted earlier, both can be traced 
to William Douglas: Chapter X explicitly required an independent 
trustee, and Douglas authored the two Supreme Court decisions hold-
ing that the "fair and equitable" standard, which was a requirement 
for reorganization under both Chapter X and prior law, incorporated 
the absolute priority rule. 99 These requirements made bankruptcy an 
extraordinarily undesirable prospect for the managers and sharehold-
96 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH. L. REV. 336, 
3 78 ( 1 993) (focusing on corporate bankruptcy). 
97 As described above, the drafter and principal advocate for these provisions was William 
Douglas himself. See supm pp. 1088-9r. 
98 See supm p. 1092. 
99 See id. 
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ers of a troubled firm , because their interests would be wiped om 111 
bankruptcy. 100 
The 1978 Code brought dramatic change to corporate reorganiza-
tion . Chapter r I, the Code's new corporate reorganization provisions , 
assumed that the firm's managers (not an independent trustee) would 
continue to run the firm in bankruptcy and gave the managers the e:~­
clusive right to propose a reorganization plan for at least the first four 
rnonths of the reorganizalion. 101 Chapter I r also significantly re-· 
trenched from the absolute priority ru le: the rule would not apply to 
any class of creditors or shareholders ,-v ho voted in favor of the pro-· 
posed p1an. 102 These changes made bankruptcy much more attracti""'=' 
for large, troubled corporations and, by the late I g8os and early I ggos, 
an unpreceden ted number of prominent firms had filed for bankruptcy 
in response to failed leveraged buyouts and other problems. 103 In 
1983, Continental Airl ines filed for Chapter II and used bankruptcy to 
renegotiate its collective bargaining agreement with employees. 104 
Federated Department Stores filed for bankruptcy after a disastrous 
leveraged buyout, and both Johns Manville and A.H. Robins invoked 
Chapter r I in the face of mushrooming tort liability. 105 
The new popularity of bankruptcy in the executive suite proved 
controversial. Although some observers cheered these developments, 
others leveled a variety of complaints. Critics asserted both that man-
agers were strategically using bankruptcy as a tool for addressing 
business concerns even in the absence of true financial distress 106 and 
that Chapter I I proceedings could be extraordinarily costly and time-
consuming for those with firms that did belong in bankruptcy. The 
only winners in many cases seemed to be bankruptcy lawyers and 
other professionals who charged by the hour. 107 
100 To avoid these strictures, an increasing number of large firms attempted to file for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter XI, the provisions designed for smaller debtors. The SEC tried, but ulti-
mately failed, to prevent this practice. For a discussion and political explanation of the demise of 
the SEC in bankruptcy, see Skeel, supm note 6r. 
101 See II u_s_c. § II07 (I994) (vesting authority in "debtor in possession"); II u_s_c. § II2I 
(I994) (providing a 120-day exclusivity period)_ 
102 See II u_s_c. § II29(b) (1994) (applying the absolute priority rule only if the class dissents). 
103 See KEVIN H. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: HOW CORPORATIONS AND 
THEIR CREDITORS USE CHAPTER I I TO THEIR ADVANTAGE 2-3 (Iggz)_ 
104 See id. at I-2. 
105 See id. at 3· 
106 See, e.g., RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON 
SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 337, 339-40 (rggr) (describing and criticizing the treatment of Dalkon 
Shield victims in the A.H. Robins bankruptcy). 
107 For a scathing account of this process- and the burden of lawyers' fees and other costs-
by the manager of a firm that filed for bankruptcy, see SOL STEIN, A FEAST FOR LAWYERS 
(Ig8g). 
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Whatever the merits of these complaints, they are closely linked to 
the changes effected by the r g 7 8 Code . Leaving managers in charge 
and relaxing the absolute priority rule have given the managers of 
large corporate debtors much more flexibility than they had in the 
past. This flexibility and the managers' exclusive right to propose a 
plan are the most obvious explanations for the prolonged duration of 
Chapter I I cases. 10s 
In a I 992 article, Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzvveig sharply 
criticize managers' role in corporate reorganization and cali for a com-
ple te revision of the Chapter I I regime. 109 :u ased on z;n extensive 
analysis of the securities prices of firms that wound up in bankruptcy, 
Bradley and Rosenzweig suggest that firms fare fa r worst under Chap-
ter r I than they would have under the prior Bankruptcy Act. 110 They 
argue that Congress should replace Chapter I I wi th a stock cancella-
tion regime that simply eliminates shareholders' interes t in the event 
the firm defaults on its obligations. In place of the flex ible approach 
of Chapter I I, their proposal would enforce a severe version of abso-
lute priority. 111 
If the views of William Douglas and the early bankruptcy progres-
sives could simply be plugged into these debates about corporate reor-
ganization, then we might expect current progressives to have agreed 
with at least some aspects of the Bradley and Rosenzweig analysis. 
The Bradley and Rosenzweig article sharply criticizes managers and 
strongly favors strict absolute priority and was viewed by the corpo-
rate bankruptcy bar as a direct assault on existing practice. 112 William 
Douglas, of course, took precisely the same stance on each of these is-
sues. Yet bankruptcy progressives uniformly have condemned the 
Bradley and Rosenzweig analysis, as evidenced most prominently in 
an attack by Elizabeth Warren, who sharply criticized the empirical 
analysis of the controversial article and has defended Chapter I I .11 3 
108 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Troub le w ith Chapto· II , I 993 \VIS. L. REV. 729, 747-49. 
109 See Michael Bradley & Michael Rose nzweig, The Untenable Case f01· ChapteY I I , IOI YALE 
L.J. I043 (I 992). 
IIO See id. at 1049, I067-72. 
III See id. at 1050, 1078-88. In the wake of the Bradley and Rosenzweig article, law and eco-
nomics sc holars proposed a variety of other alternatives to Chapter I I. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, 
Financial and Political Th eories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 3II, 3I2, 
323- 33 (I993) (arguing for a stoc k cance llatio n proposal similar to Bradley's and Rosenzweig's 
p roposal); Robert K. Rasmusse n, Debto1·'s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corpora te Bankruptcy, 7 I 
TEX. L. REV. 5 I, I00-2 I (I992) (proposing a "menu" approach allowi ng debtors to select from a 
variety of bankruptcy options). 
11 2 See Wade Lambert & Milo Geyelin, Bankruptcy Lawyers Dispute Call for Saapping Chap-
ter I I Proc ess, WALL ST. J., Mar. IQ, 1992, at Bs. 
113 See Elizabeth Warren, Th e Untenabie Case for Repeal of Chaptn· I I , I02 YALE L.J. 437, 
439- 79 (I992). Lynn LoPucki was equally dismissive. See Lynn !VI. LoPucki, Stmnge Visions in a 
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Althou gh earlier progressives would have agreed with m uch of 
\Varren 's cri tiq ue - namely, her concerns about the d ata and the lim-
ited real-world grounding of the proposed refo rm - it is useful to 
elaborate on their differences, which reflect the changes in progressive 
thinking. In her response to Bradley and Rosenzweig, and elsewhere, 
VVarren >.vorries much less than Douglas did that managers wi ll use 
ban ktuptcy to the detriment of other part ies. She and other progres-
Slves cases such as Continental, in '.vhich manage rs invoke Chap-
ter r I to achieve particular objectives , as bankru ptcy successes, not 
fai l ures . 1 1 ~ Similarly, Warren has a great deal of sym pathy for the 
flexibil i of Chapter I r and its relaxed treatrnent of the a bsolute pri-
ority rule. L ike Douglas , Warren cares deeply about d istributional is-
sues - -,vho wins and -vvho loses in bankru ptcy. One of her most fre-
quent criticism s of law-and-economics-based bankruptcy scholarship is 
that it ignores distributional effects. 11 5 Yet she has a very different v i-
sion for achieving distributional fairness. Whereas Douglas insisted on 
displacing managers and strictly adhering to the absolute priority rule , 
Warren suggests that leaving managers in place and providing a more 
flexible bankruptcy process are essential to achieving bankruptcy's dis-
tributional goals. In her most detailed analysis of the functions of 
business bankruptcy, for instance, Warren emphasizes the virtues of 
giving managers a stake in the bankruptcy decision and encouraging 
reorganization to preserve the going concern value of a troubled 
firm. 116 
\tVarren 's enthusiasm for the current Chapter I I regime also reflects 
a remarka bly different stance toward the corporate reorganization bar 
than the one taken by Douglas in the r 930s. As we saw earlier, 
Douglas vigorously attacked the bar of his day- bankruptcy lawyers 
were the target of much of his criticism of existing practice. 117 By con-
Stmnge Wm·ld: A Reply to PYojesson Bradley and Rosenzwt:ig, 9I MICH. L. REV. 79, 8I-I ro 
(1992). 
11 4 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankmptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 787 (I987) (listing Con-
tinental as one of "a host of ... bankruptcy success stories"). Although \Varren acknowledges 
critics' concerns about Chapter I I, she argues that outcomes would be far worse in the absence of 
the reorganiza tion provisions. See Elizabeth vVarren, Bankruptcy Is a Better Altemati·ue, NAT 'L 
L.J., Apr. 20, 1992, at IS [hereinafter, Warren, BetleY AlteYnative]. 
115 In an exchange with law and economics scholar Douglas Baird, Warren repeatedly criticized 
Baird 's effort to bracket distributional considerations: "Baird cannot assert that he is offering no 
distributional scheme . . Any scheme distributes, whether Baird chooses to discuss it or not." 
Warren, Bankmptcy Policy, supra note I 14, at 8oS. 
116 Warren argues that the bankruptcy system as a whole is designed to address four separate, 
though interrelated, goals: maximizing the value of the troubled firm, distributing value (by tak-
ing distributional concerns into account), internalizing the costs of failure, and encouraging debt-
ors and their managers to initiate bankruptcy, rather than relying on governmental officials to do 
so. See vVarren, supm note g6, at 344-73. In Warren's view, the more manager-friendly confines 
of Chapter II advance both the first and fourth of these goals. See id. at 372. 
117 See supm pp. ro87, rogo. 
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trast , the views of Warren and other current progressives sound sur-
pri s ing!~:/ similar to those of the lawyers whom Douglas w as busy as-
sailing. In a I 92 7 article on priorities in bankruptcy, for instance, 
bankruptcy lawyer Robert Swaine defended relaxed priority rules as 
essential to promoting reorganization. 1 18 Niore recent bankruptcy pro-
gressives share Swaine's assumption th at reorganization must be en-
couraged, despi te the attack on this position by their predecessor 
Douglas. 
Not surp risingly, these vie'vvs have endeared bankruptcy progres·· 
sives to the current corporate reorganization bar.11 9 It is difficult to 
imagine the members of the >Jational Bankruptcy Confe rence im·itir:g 
William Douglas to join thern in the I 930s, as they did Elizabeth 'War·· 
ren in the early r ggos. By a ll accoun ts , 'Warren has become an enor-
mously influential member of the Conference, -vv hich has long been the 
bankruptcy bar 's most prominent reform and lo bbying organization. 1 20 
I n 1995, Warren was appointed chief advisor to the newly formed 
N ational Bankruptcy Review Commission. 121 For the next two years, 
she led the Commission in the most thorough assessment of U.S. bank-
ruptcy law in twenty years. The Commission's proposals reflect many 
of the progressive views that I discuss above. In the context of per-
sonal bankruptcy, the Commission strongly endorsed debtors ' access to 
an immediate discharge, and rejected calls by creditors for means 
testing provisions that would force debtors to use Chapter 13 if they 
were able to repay some of their debts. 122 In an effort to preempt the 
11 8 S ee Swaine, supm note 7 5, at 90 7. 
11 9 Other prominent p rogre ss ive s, such as Lynn LoPucki and Karen Gross, have a lso estab-
li shed (or maintained) c lose ti es to th e bankru ptcy bar. 
120 Warren has se rved as a mem ber of the exec uti ve committee a nd as a chai r of the new mem-
bers committee . S ee E-Mail Correspondence from Professor Douglas Baird, Uni ve rsi ty of C hi-
cago Law School, to David Skeel (Fe b. 9, 2000) (on file with the au thor); see also Teleph one fnter· 
view with Gera ld Smi th, Lewi s & Roca , Phoe nix, Ariz. (Feb. 8, 2000) (noting Wa rren's influ ence). 
121 Depending on how one coun ts (and w ha t one includes), this Commission, whi ch issued its 
report in O ctober 199 7, was the fourth major governmenta l study of bankrup tcy in this centu ry. 
The four studies are: r) the Donova n and Thac her reports of the early I9JOS, which investigated 
a buses in ba nkruptcy administ ration , see supm note 48 ; 2) the SE C "protective commi ttee" study 
headed by William Douglas, see supm pp . ro88- 89; 3) a report by the National Ba nk rup tcy 
Co mmission of 197 3, which proposed the swee ping ove rhaul of U. S. bankrup tcy law tha t even tu-
ally led to the enactment of the 1978 Code, see COMMISSION ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF TH F: 
UNITED STATES, R EPORT, H .R . Doc. NO. 93-137 , (1973) (hereinafte r 1973 C 0:'-1MISSIO N 
REPORT]; a nd 4) a report by the National Bankruptcy Review Commission o f 1997, see N AT 'L 
B ANKR. R EVIEW C OMM'N, BAN KRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWE NTY YEARS (1997), ava ilable at 
National Bankmptcy R ev iew Commission (visited Jan . 2 4, 2000) <http://www.nbrc. go v/report-
cont.html> (hereinafte r 1997 COMMISSIO N R EPORT]. 
122 S ee 1997 COM:VIISSION R EPORT, supra note 12 1, ch. r , at 89- 91 (c riti cizin g " means testin g" 
proposals that would require m ore debtors to use Chapter 13 and concluding that th e Commis-
sion's "proposals contemplate no cha nge in the basic stru cture of consumer b ankruptcy"). \Varren 
explains the Commission 's views a nd defends the immediate disc ha rge agains t cri tic ism by the 
consumer credi t industry in several ar ticles p ublished since the 1997 Commission Report was re-
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1997 Commission proposals, the consumer credit industry introduced 
legislation that had considerable support in Congress last fall and is 
currently pending. Warren has served as an informal advisor to Hil-
lary Clinton, 123 and has actively campaigned against this legislation. 
In business bankruptcy, the Commission worked closely with the 
bankruptcy bar and proposed to preserve and in several respects to 
expand the current framework . The Commission 's deliberations on 
"prepackaged bankruptcies" are illustrati ve . In a prepackaged bank-
ruptcy, a troubled fi rm's managers solicit support for a reorganization 
proposal before they file for bankruptcy. They then submit the firm' s 
proposed reorganization plan along with the initial bankruptcy peti-
tion. William Douglas and the bankruptcy progressives railed against 
pre-bankruptcy solicitations in the 1930s, and such solicitations were 
fo rbidden from 1938 unti l Congress again authorized them in 1978.124 
The Commission, by contras t, supported prepackaged bankruptcy: one 
staff memo even proposed to expand it significantly by exempting pre-
bankruptcy solicitations from the federal securities laws. 125 The 
Commission 's final recommendation was slightly more limited but 
nonetheless evinces an unmistakable enthusiasm for prepackaged 
bankruptcy and for the flexible Chapter I I reorganization process as a 
whole. 126 
leased. S ee Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. LJ. Io8o (I998) (analyzing and 
answe ring studies on bankruptcy sponsored by the consumer credit industry); Elizabeth Warren, 
A Principled Approach to Consumer Bankruptcy, 7I A::vr. BANKR. L.J. 483 (I 997) (cliscussing the 
process tha t influenced the Commission 's recommendations about the consumer bankruptcy sys-
tem) [hereinafter Warren, A Principled Approach]. 
123 See Katharine Q. Seelye, First Lady in a 1Yfessy Fight On the Eve of H er Campaign, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 27, I999, at AI ("In the spring of I998, Mrs. Clin ton sought a private tutorial in 
bankruptcy law from a H arvard Law professor, Elizabeth Warren, who has strongly opposed the 
legislation."). 
124 Douglas and the early progressiv es believed that the practice of pre-bankruptcy solicitation 
magnified the influence of the Wall Street bankers and lawye rs, because it allowed them to take 
advantage of the limited information and influence of scatte red in vestors. As noted earlier, the 
Chandler Act addressed this conce rn by prohibiting the parties from soliciting the approval of 
banks and lawyers until after the cour t had give n its blessing to the reo rganization plan in ques-
tion. See Pub. L No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682 (repealed 1978). The 1978 Code expressly authorize s 
pre-bankruptcy solicitations. See I r U.S.C. § 1I26 (1994). 
125 See Memorandum from Jay M. Goffman , Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom to Eliza-
beth Warren, Proposed Amendments to Bankmptcy Code and Securities Laws R elating to Pre-
packaged Bankmptcy Cases s-6 (June 12, 1997) (on file with the author) . 
126 S ee 1997 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 121 , ch. 2, at 589- 95 (applying the rules of the 
Bankruptcy Code and waiving sec urities law disclosure requireme nts for solicitations made 
within 12 0 days prior to bankruptcy). T he Commission's proposal to exempt prepackaged bank-
ruptcy from the securities laws did not mee t uniform approval. For example, it drew a concerned 
lette r from Richard Walker, General Co unsel of the SEC, who questioned whether the need to 
reduce costs and streamline bankruptcy "is a sufficient basis for the elimination of important se-
curities law protections for public in vestors provided by Securities Act registration." Lette r from 
Richard H. Walker, General Cou nse l, SEC, to National Bankruptcy Review Commission (Oc t. I , 
1997) (on file with the author). 
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C learly something has changed in the years since 'Wi lliam Douglas 
fi rst campaigned for bankruptcy reform. The reader probably suspects 
that there are good reasons for the shift in progressives' views, and 
there are. Many of the problems that preoccupied Douglas and his 
peers were addressed by the New Deal fin ancial and market reforms, 
for instance; other concerns took their place . To appreciate how pro-
gressive thinking has evolved, we must turn to the scholar whose •,vork 
connects Douglas and current progressives: Ve rn Countryman. 
II . VE RN COUNTRYMAN: THE LiNK BETWEE:': THEN A::'-TD NO\V 
Many of us remember from childhood a game call ed "\Vhispering 
Down the Lane."127 In \Nhispering Down the Lane, one child whis-
pers a statement or anecdote to the second ch ild in a chain , and the 
second child to a third. By the time the message gets back to the fi rst 
ch ild , it often bears little resemblance to that child's original state-
ment. Something like this distortion seems to have taken place, a t 
least superficially, in progressive bankruptcy scholarship. As we move 
from Douglas to Countryman to Warren, the perspective on bank-
ruptcy changes dramatically. Yet it is also clear that the general goals 
- the commitments - of progressive scholars have remained stable. 
In this Part, I explain why progressives' vision of bankruptcy has 
changed, even as their overall goals have endured. The inquiry leads 
us straight to the central link in the chain: Vern Countryman. In ways 
both simple and complex, arising both from his own disposition and 
from changes in debtors, investors, and the credit markets, Country-
man marks the transition between the past and present of progress ive 
bankruptcy theory. 
T his Part begins by considering Countryman's personal and intel-
lectual relationship with William Douglas. Despite their close ties, 
Countryman's perspective on bankruptcy differed from Douglas's in 
three crucial respects. First, Countryman focused far more on per-
sonal bankruptcy, whereas Douglas was best known for his work on 
large-scale corporate reorganization. Second, unlike Douglas, who re-
peatedly attacked the bar of his day, Countryman developed a close 
working relationship with the bankruptcy bar. Finally, Countryman 
was far more skeptical than Douglas of instrumental analysis, as evi-
denced by Countryman's hostile response to the emerging law and 
economics movement. After developing each of these distinctions in 
the fir st section, this Part considers how these tendencies have influ-
enced the work of Elizabeth Warren and other current bankruptcy 
progressives. By tracing the course of progress ive bankruptcy scholar-
ship from Douglas to Countryman and from Countryman to curren t 
l2i Others may remember the game as "Rumors," "Operato r," or "Telephone." 
2000] VERN COUNTRY1vfAN 1103 
scholars, this Part shows how and why the focus of progressive schol-
ars has shifted since its origins in the work of William Douglas. 
A. Almost in His Mentor's Footsteps 
The link between Vern Countryman and the leading New Deal 
bankruptcy progressive, William Douglas, could not be more explicit. 
Like Douglas, Countryman grew up in the West and attended college 
in the state of Washington. Upon graduating from law school in 1942 , 
Countryman applied for a clerkship with Justice Douglas, who had 
been appointed to the Supreme Court just three years earlier. The let-
ter of recommendation written by the dean of Countryman's law 
school suggests why Douglas found his application so attractive. 
Countryman's credentials were impressive. He graduated third in his 
class and served as President of the Washington Law Review. 128 At 
least as impressive, however, was the fact that Countryman had sup-
ported himself throughout college and law school. "During the sum-
mer vacations," the dean wrote, "he has worked as a manual laborer in 
the saw mill and pulp and paper mills at Longview. During the school 
years, he has worked part-time."129 This fact surely reminded Douglas 
of his own experiences working himself through college, which he re-
membered with pride throughout his life. 130 Douglas offered Coun-
tryman the clerkship, and he soon became Countryman's mentor. 
Countryman served as Douglas's clerk during the 1942 Term, 
shortly after Douglas had written several enormously important bank-
ruptcy decisions. 131 Countryman's clerkship was a smashing success, 
and in subsequent years, Douglas would repeatedly refer to Country-
man as having been one of his best clerks ever. 
After his clerkship and a two-year stint in the Army during World 
War II, Countryman entered academia, just as Douglas had done. 132 
128 See Letter from Judson F. Falknor, Dean, University of Washington School of Law, to Jus-
tice William 0. Douglas (June I8, I942) (on file with the Library of Congress, Douglas Papers, 
Container No. I I IS). Attached to the letter is a copy of Countryman's law school transcript. 
129 Jd. 
130 Douglas's biographer reports that Douglas "had been hired as an all-purpose handyman at 
Falkenberg's Jewelry Store" prior to his freshman year at vVhitman College in Walla Walla, 
vVashington. "He had also signed on as an early-morning janitor in a candy store and as a dinner-
hour waiter in a hash house." SIMON, supra note Ig, at 48. For Douglas's own account of his 
crowded college schedule, see DOUGLAS, Go EAST, supra note 64, at 97-98. 
131 Two of the most important were Douglas's decisions defining the absolute priority rule. See 
Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. sro (I94I); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber 
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. ro6 (I9JC)); supra p. Iogz. 
132 After the clerkship and his time in the Army, and before leaving for Yale Law School in 
I947, Countryman taught for a year at the University of Washington School of Law. See 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS: 
rgg8-gg, at 360 (IggS) (containing biographical data for Countryman). 
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With a glowing recommendation from Douglas, 133 he was awarded a 
fellowship at Yale Law School for 1947 and appointed to the Yale fac -
ulty the following year. N ot surprisingly, given his rela tionship with 
Douglas, Countrym an chose to specialize in bankruptcy law. 
During his years at Yale, Countryman became involved in the loy-
alty cases that would mire his career in controversy. Like m any N ew 
Deal liberals , Countryman vvas appalled by the treatment of individu-
als who had been accused of ties to the Comm unist Party. By the 
early rgs os, it w as clear that defending those accused of un-American 
acti vities was a dangerous career move fo r a lawyer or law profes-
sor. 134 Countryman did not f1inch . He vvrote a critical book on the 
investigation of un-American activities in the state of vVashington and 
a series of articles on the plight of lawyers who defended ind ividuals 
accused of Com munist Party activities. 135 (Douglas took a similar 
stance from his perch on the Supreme Court, authoring a prominent 
dissenting opinion insisting that the defendants ' First Amendment 
rights were being violated.136) Countryman also became actively in-
volved in several cases; most galling to the Yale administration was his 
defense of Yale Medical School professor John Peters, who was ac-
cused of un-American activities but later vindicated .!3i 
In 195 4, after the law school faculty unanimously voted to grant 
Countryman tenure, Yale 's president, Alfred Griswold, and the new 
law school dean, H arry Shulman, refused to move forward with his 
application. Justice Douglas was a powerful presence in Yale circles 
during this era, and when he learned of Countryman 's troubles, he 
sent angry letters to both the president and the dean. "Yale Law has 
had a great liberal tradition, " he wrote to President Griswold: 
There are many who feel that th at tradition will suffer grievously if Coun-
tryman 's abili ty and character a re not recognized. . . . H e has a keen-
edged [mind], one of the best I have known. He has, I understand, been 
133 Douglas wrote to Wesley Sturges, a close friend and by thi s time the dean of Yale L aw 
School: 
[Countryman] is a first-rate man in every respect. He clid excellent wo rk for me. And I 
would rate him as high as any law clerk I have known at the Court. . . He has a very 
supe rior mind, great capacity for wo rk, imagination, creative ability, and resourceful-
ness. He is an unusually gifted person. 
Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Wesley A. Sturges, Dean , Ya le Law School (May 3, 
1946) (on file with the Library of Congress, Douglas Papers, Container No. I I I 8). 
134 For a fasc inating account of the loyalty cases from the perspective of Abe Fortas and the 
Vlashington Jaw firm now called Arnold & Porter, which was one of the few Jaw firm s willing to 
represent loyalty case de fendants, see L AURA K ALMAN , ABE FORTA S: A BIOGRAPHY I 25 -5 I 
(1990). 
135 See sources cited cited above in note 9· For a description of Countryman 's role , and of the 
Yale tenure fight desc ribed in the text below, see K ALMAN, cited above in note q, at 196- 200. 
!36 See Dennis v. United State s, 341 U.S. 494 , 581-92 (1 95 r) (Douglas, ]. , dissenting). 
137 See KALMAN, supra note I?, at I 97 · 
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active in certain loyalty cases. But that too is in the tradition of the law, 
at least from the time of Erskine who d.efe1.1d.ed Tom Paine in court.138 
To Dean Shulman, Douglas was even more strident: "If Country-
man is denied promotion, think of the reaction [of] the lavv clerks of 
today. Those who want to teach will look elsewhere . As some young 
Yale Law alumni told me in St. Louis last Saturday, ' Countryman is 
the best teacher Yale has today. "'139 
In the end, the Yale admi.nistr<:'!.tion ;,vould not be persuaded. Gris-
wold and Shulman insisted that they had focused on Countryman 's 
scholarship, not his loyalty acti vities, and they attempted to defuse the 
controversy by offering to reappoint Countryman for several more 
years and to revisit the tenure issue in the future. Instead of accepting, 
Countryman resigned.140 He vvorked for several years in a V./ashing-
ton, D .C. law fi rm, then returned to academia to accept the deanship 
at the University of N ew Mexico School of Law. In 1964, Countryman 
was appointed to the faculty at Harvard Law School, where he would 
spend the final two decades of his career. Given Harvard 's longtime 
reputation as somewhat stodgy and less cutting-edge than Yale, 141 the 
appointment surprised and delighted both Countryman and his men-
tor. "I have accepted a permanent appointment here," Countryman 
wrote to Douglas, "largely because I couldn't resist the opportunity to 
sound a dissenting voice from this forum." 14 2 Douglas responded: 
"[The appointment is] the nicest thing I have heard about Harvard 
Law School in a long time. I cannot believe they are looking for en-
lightenment but the mere fact that they did tolerate harassment makes 
them deserving of some credit."143 
Throughout his career, Countryman did as much to promote 
Douglas's reputation as his mentor had done for him. Countryman 
was long known as Douglas's principal defender in the academic 
world. In 1959, he published a book of Douglas's Supreme Court de-
cisions, and he wrote numerous laudatory articles on the J ustice's 
138 Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Dr. Alfred Whitney Griswold, Preside nt, Yale 
U niversity (Jan. 26, I955) (on file with the Library of Congress, Douglas Papers, Container No. 
I rr8). 
139 Letter fro m Justice William 0. Douglas to Ha rr; Shulman, Dean, Yale Law School (Jan. 2 7, 
I 955 ) (on file Viith the Library of Congress, Douglas Papers, Container No. I I I 8) . 
140 See KALMAN, supra note I?, at r g8-gg. 
141 Harvard's reputation dated back to the rise of legal realism and the attack on Langdellian 
legal science in Douglas's era, and included often bitte r attacks by Yale professors on Harvard 
Law School, and vice versa. S ee KALMA N, supra notP. 17, at 25-29. 
142 Le tter from Vern Countryman to Justice William 0. Douglas (undated) (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress, Douglas Papers, Container N o. I I IS). 
143 Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas to Vern Countryman (Jan. 14, I964) (on fil e with the 
Library of Congress, Douglas Papers, Container No. 1 r 18). 
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handiwork. 144 Countryman's close intellectual and personal bond with 
D ouglas was a pervasive feature of his academic ca reer, and it ex-
tended, of course, to Countryman's work on bankruptcy. L ike Doug-
las before him, Countryman was the leading progressive bankruptcy 
scholar of his era, and he co-authored an influential legal realist case-
book on bankruptcy law. 145 Despite the continuities , however, Coun-
tryman 's perspecti ve on bankruptcy differed from tha t of D ouglas in 
several subtle but crucial respects. These divergences reflected both 
changes in the world since Douglas's bankruptcy work in the I 930s, 
and differences in Countryman himself. 
I. Countryman 's Concentration on Personal Bankrupicy. The 
most obvious difference between Countryman's writings and those of 
Douglas is one of emphasis: although Douglas wrote about both per-
sonal and corporate bankruptcy, large scale corporate bankruptcy 
came to dominate Douglas's attention after his appointment to the 
SEC, and he is best known for his work on corporate reorganization. 
Countryman, by contrast, showed much more interest in personal 
bankruptcy than in business failure. Like Douglas, he wrote on both, 
but far more of his work focused on personal bankruptcy. At first 
glance, emphasizing personal rather than corporate bankruptcy may 
not seem significant. But the two differ in important respects, due in 
part to the contrast between individuals and artificial entities such as 
corporations. 146 These distinctions figured prominently in the emer-
gence of current progressive bankruptcy theory. 
Although it is impossible to know for sure why Countryman gravi-
tated toward personal bankruptcy rather than business issues, there is 
a readily inferable connection to his concern for civil liberties and in-
dividual freedoms. When asked about Countryman's focus on indi-
144 See DOUGLAS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A SELECTION OF HIS OPINIONS (Vern Coun-
try·man ed., 1959). Countryman's articles on Douglas include Vern Countryman, Scholarship and 
Common Sense, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1407 (1980) [hereinafter, Countryman, Common Sense]; Vern 
Countryman, Search and Seizure in a Shambles? Recasting Fourth Amendment Law in the Mold 
of Justice Douglas, 64 IOWA L. REV. 435 (1979); Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas and Freedom 
of Expression, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 301 (1978); Vern Countryman, The Contribution of the Douglas 
Dissents, ro GA. L. REV. 331 (1976); Vern Countryman, Business Regulation, 74 COLUM. L. 
REV. 366 (1974), one of a group of articles in tribute to Justice Douglas; Vern Countryman, Jus-
tice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law, 16 UCLA L. REV. 773 (1969); and Vern Coun-
tryman , The Constitution and Job Discrimination, 39 WASH. L. REV. 74 (1964). 
145 See VERN COUNTRYMAN & JAMES WILLIAM MOORE, DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS' 
RIGHTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (1951); see also KALMAN, supra note 17, at 189 (describing 
Countryman's casebook as squarely within the legal realist tradition). Countryman also co-
authored a casebook on lawyers and legal ethics. VERN COUNTRYMAN & TED FIN MAN, THE 
LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY (1966). 
146 The strongest justification for discharging an individual's obligations- to give her a "fresh 
start" that relieves her of her burden of debt and motivates her to try starting anew - applies 
much less powerfully to a corporate debtor because corporations are artificial entities that do not 
need to be preserved if they are financially unviable. 
2000 ] VE R N COUNTR YMAN I I O/ 
'Iidual bankruptcies, one longtime fr iend and prominent lawyer imme-
diately noted Countryman 's identifi cation with the "little guy."14' An-
other recalled that when Countrym an first became involved in the 
consumer lavv committee of the American Bar Association, he was ap-
palled that consumer cred itors domin ated the activities while debtors 
seemed to have no voice.148 It is not surprising that the bankruptcy 
scholar who defended the liberties of men and women accused of sub-
version in the 195 0s a lso stood up for troubled debtors in the decades 
th at fo ll ovved . 
J usti ce Douglas was also famous for his emphasis on individual lib-
erties, of course . In a t ribute to Douglas after the J ustice 's death, 
Countryman praised his mentor fo r taking "a more hospitable \'i e\v of 
individua l freedom under the Constitu tion than any other J usti ce be-
fore and since,"149 and for "tak[ingj government off the backs of peo-
ple." 150 B ut these issues were not quite so pressing for bankruptcy 
scholars in the 1930s, when Douglas was writing, as they would be-
come in the r 96os, when Countryman had assumed the mantle of the 
leading progressive bankruptcy scholar.151 The battles over individual 
liberties in the r 950s may have had a ripple effect on the field of bank-
ruptcy, focusing attention on the travails of financially troubled debt-
ors. Of much more obvious and immediate significance, however, 
were changes in the credit markets . 
Prior to World War II, ordinary consumers had only limited access 
to credit. Many individuals conducted all of their transactions in cash, 
except for credit arrangements with grocers and other small suppliers. 
After World War II, consumer credit exploded. In addition to the sus-
tained growth of home mortgage lending, installment credit increased, 
and the advent of credit cards made consumer credit available at pre-
viously unheard-of levels. The overall effect was unmistakable. As 
Countryman frequently noted at congressional hearings and elsewhere, 
total consumer credit exclusive of mortgages expanded from $30 bil-
lion in 1945 to more than $569 billion in 1974.152 Along with the vast 
14 7 Telephone In te rview with Gerald Smi th, Lewis & Roca, Phoenix , Ariz. (Aug. 9, 1999). 
148 See Telephone Interview with Professo r Lawrence King, New York University School of 
Law Ouly 20, 1999). 
149 Countryman , Common Sense, supra note 144, at 1407. 
150 !d. (q uoting Sc hneider v. Smith , 390 U.S I/ , 25 (1968 ) (Douglas, ]. , dissenting)) (in te rnal 
qu ota tion marks omitted). 
151 Countryman may have been eve n more committed to civil li be rties than was Douglas. In 
an interview many years after his clerkship with Douglas, Countryman recoun ted their passionate 
arguments on the fi rst Japanese in te rnmen t case. Countryma n insisted tha t internment \·io lated 
Japanese-American citizens ' F irst Amendment righ ts, but Douglas voted with the Supreme Co ur t 
majority to uphold t he wartime measure. S ee SIMON , supra note r g, at 242-43 (desc ribing Coun-
tryman 's and Douglas's a rguments about Hirabayashi v. Uni ted Sta tes, 320 U.S . Sr (1943)). 
152 See, e.g., Countryma n, supm note 68, a t r (citi ng F ED . RE SE RVE B ULL. A52, A5 4 (Dec . 
I9 70)); id. at A44, A47 Ouly 19 74)). At the same tim e, perso nal bankruptcy filings a lso expanded 
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expansion of consumer credit and consumer sales came increasing 
complaints of creditor misbehavior. The most dramatic response out-
side of bankruptcy to these developments was the emergence of a 
powerful consumer protection movement. 153 The effect inside bank-
ruptcy circles was to focus much more attention on personal bank-
ruptcy.154 
The postwar trends in corporate bankruptcy also contributed to 
this shift in attention. D uring the I 930s, corporate bankruptcy had 
taken center stage as Douglas and other progressives excoriated the 
dominance of Wall Street bankers and lawyers in corporate reorganiza-
tion practice. In the postvvar era, by contrast , corporate bankruptcy 
quickly faded as an issue fo r most progressive scholars. T he most ob-
vious reason was a remarkable drop in corporate bankruptcy filings. 
In 1939, the first year of the Chandler Act ,155 577 debtors fi led for 
C hapter X , the provisions designed for large corporations. O ne year 
later, the number dropped to 2 9 r, and by the mid- r 94os, most years 
saw fewer than a hundred new filings .156 After so many firms had 
failed during the Depression, and with the markets just getting back 
on their feet , bankruptcy did not seem so pressing a concern. Contrib-
uting to the lack of urgency was the fact that William Douglas and his 
fellow progressives had solved precisely the problems against which 
they had railed. 157 T he progressives' great concern had been Wall 
dramatically, from II ,OSI in I945 to 97,750 in Ig6o and to 178,202 in I970. See STANLEY & 
GIRTH, supra note 83, at 25 tbl.3-r. 
!53 Nationally, the consumer advocacy movement was often associated with Ralph Nader and 
his allies. Consumer advocates scored important victories in commercial law with the enactment 
of such legislation as the Consumer Credit Protection Act of rg68, Pub. L. No. 90-32I, 82 Stat. 
I46 (codified as amended at IS U.S.C. §§ I60I-I693r (Supp. IV Igg8)), and state provisions based 
on the Uniform Consumer Credit Code promulgated by the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws in I974, UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 7A U.L.A. I (I974). 
154 Indeed, Bill Whitford has suggested that personal bankruptcy has become one of the few 
remaining strongholds of individualized justice for consumers, given the trend toward class-action 
consumer litigation. See William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: Consumer 
Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankntptcy, 68 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 397, 402-03 (I 994). 
155 For a discussion of the Chandler Act, see note 67. 
156 From I939 to I953, the numbers of Chapter X cases filed were as follows: 
I9:l9: S77 I944: 9S I_2'l_9_: I I} 
I940: 29I I 94S: 70 r9so: !02 
I94I: 29I I946: 6o I95 I: 75 
I942: I6S I947: 94 I 9S 2: 64 
I94.,: I09 1948: IOS I 9S o: 6I 
See Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judiciary iv! achin-
ery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 778 (I97S) [hereinafter 1975-1976 Senate 
Hearings]. 
lSi Because filing for bankruptcy under Chapter X meant that managers of large firms would 
lose their jobs to an independent trustee, such managers avoided Chapter X for as long as possi-
2000] VERN COUNTRYlv!AN rrog 
Street's dominance of corporate reorganization . After Congress 
adopted the Chandler Act of 1938, the Wall Street bankers and law-
yers quickly disappeared from corporate bankruptcy. Gone were the 
days when manage rs, bankers, and the elite bar met in fancy hotels to 
dec ide the fate of large, troubled corporations. 
Thus, by the rg6os, the bankruptcy villa in had changed . Wall 
Street had declined as a serious threat in bankru ptC)-', and progressive 
scholars were increasingly concerned about the enorm ous consumer 
credit industry. Vern Countryman 's career nicely reflected this shift. 
In 1972, Douglas asked Countrym an whether the rg3os SEC Report 
had inspired any thoughts on corporate bankruptcy. "I read the eight 
volurnes of the SEC Protective Committee study before I reported to 
you for d uty," Countryman responded, '' but no books or articles re-
sulted."158 Instead , Countryman focused his scholarly energies on the 
plight of consumer bankrupts. 
Like Douglas before him, Vern Countrym an almost invariably 
sought to convert his proposed reforms into concrete legislative action. 
Perhaps his most cherished reform was one that he designed to address 
a concern he called "improvident credit extension. "159 T he inspiration 
for Countryman 's proposal was the inclusion in the Uniform Commer-
cial Code of a provision precluding the enforcement of "unconscion-
able" terms in consumer contracts.16° Countryman argued that Con-
gress should disallo\\1 the claims of any creditor who had extended 
credit to a debtor who later filed for bankruptcy and whom the credi-
tor could not reasonably have expected to pay.161 Although Country-
man later persuaded the r 97 3 Bankruptcy Commission to include his 
provision in proposed legislation, Congress never adopted it. 162 M ore 
successful were Countryman's efforts to expand the bankruptcy dis-
charge in 19 70. Countryman played a prominent role in the campaign 
ble. In late r years, they increasingly sought to in voke the less onerous provisions of Chapter XI, 
which was designed for smaller firm s. See Skeel, supra note 30, at 1341-42. 
158 Letter from Vern Coun tryman to Willi am Douglas (Nov. 15, 1972) (on file with the Library 
of Congress, Douglas Pape rs, Co ntainer No. 11 18). 
15 9 Countryman, supra note 68, at r-7. 
160 See id. at 9 ("This proposal [an earlier version of Countryman's ultimate proposa l] was 
modeled on § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code .... "). Under U.C.C. § 2-302, courts are 
a uthorized to invalidate "unco nscionable" sales transactions. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1997). 
161 Countryman proposed that lawmakers define an "impro vide nt credit extension" as "a con-
tractual extensi on of credit to a debtor where it cannot reasonably be expected that the debtor can 
repay .. . in view of the circumstances of the debtor at the time credi t was extended as these cir-
cumstances were known to the creditor or would have been revealed to him on reasonable inqui ry 
prior to the credit exte nsion. " Countryman , supra note 68, at 23. 
162 S ee 1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 121, pt. I, at 2 2 (noting that the proposed § 4-
403(c) would disallow any "unconscionable consumer claim"). Countryman continued to advocate 
the provision throughout the lengthy legislative process that led to the 1978 Code. See, e.g., I975-
I976 Senate H earings, supra note 156, at 1037 (statement of Vern Countryman) (arguing for dis-
a llowance of claims based on improvide nt credit exte nsions). 
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to pass legislation that precluded creditors from bringing state lavl ac-· 
tions challenging a debtor's d ischarge after the bankruptcy case 
ended. 163 
In addition to devoting more of his attention to personal bank-
ru ptcy than Douglas, Countryman also took a crucially different stance 
on the appropriate scope of governmental oversight. Recall th at 
Douglas had enthusiastically supported the 1932 proposal to give 
bankruptcy officials the authority to delay or condition a debtor 's clis-
charge.164 Unlike Douglas, w hose vievvs reflected New Deal confi-
dence in paternalistic governmental intervention, Countryman ~v-ehe­
mently opposed efforts to limit debtors' access to a discharge. W hen 
the consurner creditor industry began to promote legislation to force 
more debtors into Chapter 13, Countryman analogized the effort to the 
1932 proposal- the same reform Douglas had supported- and larn-
basted the earlier legislation as, "to my knowledge, the only proposed 
bankruptcy legislation in this country to be characterized by witnesses 
as 'UnAmerican. "'165 Although Countryman thought that creditors 
should encourage debtors to use Chapter 13, he also believed that 
debtors rather than courts should be the ones to make this decision. 166 
It is important to emphasize that Countryman did not simply ig-
nore corporate bankruptcy. To the contrary, he weighed in on the sub-
ject throughout his career. Two of his most famous articles - his dis-
course on executory contracts and his examination of the role of state 
law in bankruptcy - addressed issues relevant to both corporate and 
personal bankruptcy. 167 Countryman also defended both the SEC's 
role in bankruptcy and the preservation of the absolute priority rule in 
corporate reorganization. 168 In the hearings that led to the enactment 
163 Prior to the 1970 amendment, Pub. L. No. gr-467, 84 Stat. 990 (1970), creditors often chal-
lenged debtors' bankruptcy discharges in state court, alleging that the creditors' claims should not 
be treated as discharged due to fraud by the debtors. Critics complained that the suits amounted 
to harassment, and many debtors could not afford to contest them. The 1970 amendment re-
quired that challenges to a debtor's discharge be brought in the bankruptcy court before the con-
clusion of the case. See id. at 992-93. For a background discussion of the amendment and its 
history, see Vern C. Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. r (1971). 
164 See supra pp. 1086-87. 
165 Countryman, supra note 89, at 821 (quoting Joint Hearing on S. 3863 Before Subcomms. of 
the House and Senate Judiciary Comrns., 73d Cong. 546, 743 (1932)). 
166 See Vern Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1460 (1964) (de-
scribing the voluntary wage earner plan in Chapter XIII- the predecessor to current Chapter r 3 
- as a "solution[] available under the Bankruptcy Act which [is] preferable, from the creditors' 
viewpoint, to a straight bankruptcy proceeding"). 
16i See Countryman, supra note 6 (discussing the role of executory contracts in both corporate 
and personal bankruptcy law); Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (pis. 
I & 2), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 631 (1972) (arguing that Congress should override state law on 
various bankruptcy issues, rather than simply adhering to state law in bankruptcy). 
168 See Smith, supra note 2, at 4· 
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of the I 978 Code, Countryman had several complaints abou t the I 97 3 
Commission's proposal to relax the a bsolute priority rule:16 9 
The best that can be said for [the Commission 's) formul ation is that the 
"fair a nd eq uitable" standard [a term of art for the absolute priority rule] 
is now surrounded by weasel words . . .. It seems apparent that the [ I9i3 ] 
C ommission 's hope was th at th e court will operate in this leeway to in-
crease the valua tion on wh ich the plan is based a nd th us to increase the 
participation of junior interests .... Th is proposal is not likely to produce 
more sound and successful reorganizations and I urge the Subcommittee to 
return to the or iginal "fa ir and equitabl e" test withou t the leeway-
providi ng verbiage. 1 70 
Countryman's enthusiasm for absolute priority and the SEC under-
scores his link to William Douglas. But Countryman's principal con-
cern throughout his career was personal bankruptcy, and in this he 
ventured beyond his mentor 's footsteps. 
2. A Lifelong Alliance with the Bankruptcy Bar. T he second dis-
tinction between Countryman and his mentor was in their relation-
ships with the bankruptcy bar. As we have seen, Douglas almost glee-
fully attacked both the general bankruptcy bar and the elite corporate 
reorganization bar. 171 His vision for personal and small business 
bankruptcy would have destabilized existing practice, at least for 
bankruptcy lawyers, and Douglas launched an all-out assault on the 
Wall Street lawyers who had dominated large-scale reorganization for 
decades. 
The relationship between Vern Countryman and the bar could not 
have been more different. Although Countryman criticized certain as-
pects of bankruptcy practice, such as bankruptcy judges' involvement 
in both judicial and administrative issues under the old Act, 172 he 
worked closely with the bankruptcy bar for decades. By the early 
Ig6os, he was a leading presence on the American Bar Association 's 
169 The 19 73 Commission proposed to retain the absolute priority rule, but to relax the valua-
tion procedure by permitti ng plans that gave junior credi tors an interest as long as there was a 
"re asonable basis for the valuation" and a '" reasonable probability ' of full y compe nsating prior 
claims and interests. " 1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 121, pt. II , at 255 (explaining 
proposed§ 7-303). As finally enacted , the 1978 Code went fur ther, and waved off absolu te prior-
ity a ltogether for any class that vo ted in favor of th e plan. See supra p. 1097 . 
170 1975-1976 Senate Hearings, supra note 156, at 1043. In te restingly, give n the recent deba te 
over the so-called new value exception to the absolute priority rule, Countryman also sharp ly 
criticized the 197 3 Commission's proposal to permi t existing shareholders to parti cipate in a reor-
ganization if they "make a contribu tion whic h is important to the operation of the reorganized 
debtor." I d. at 1044 (qu oting § 7-303 of the Bankruptcy Act) (internal quotati on marks omitted). 
171 See supra pp. ro86- 87, 1090. 
17 2 He also was willing to cri ticize the judge s themselves, at least in the aggregate . "The re a rc 
some very good prese ntly incumbent bankruptcy judges, " Countryman to ld Congress in 1977 , 
"but there a re also some te rrible ones. We rea lly need to elevate the status of this court so that 
we can attract better people ." Heari ngs Befm·e the Sub comm. on Civil and Constitut ional Is su es 
of the House Comm. on the Judic iary, 95th Co ng. 25 4 (1977) (state ment of Ve rn Countryma n). 
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bankruptcy committees, and he joined the bankruptcy bar's principal 
reform organization, the National Bankruptcy Conference (NBC), a t 
roughly the same time. Countryman later became vice-chair of the 
Conference, and he testified before Congress on the NBC's behalf at 
hearing after hearing. 1 7 3 
Countryman's close ties to the bankruptcy bar are espec ially sur-
prising considering that both his seedtime \Vith Will iam D ouglas and 
the defiant stance he took in the loyalty cases of the r gsos seemed to 
align him squarely against the established bar. 174 Several factors m ay 
help to make sense of Countryman's rap prochement "With practicing 
attornevs. The first is the status of the bar itself. As I describe in the 
preceding section, the Chandler Act of 1938 devastated the elite corpo-
rate reorganization bar, ushering Wall Street out of bankruptcy alto-
gether. Within a few years, corporate reorganization practice lost all of 
its cachet and descended to the status that had previously been occu-
pied only by the general bankruptcy bar. 175 T he most prominent \Nall 
Street law firms abandoned the practice. A disproportionate number 
of the lawyers who filled the gap, and rose to the top of the practice in 
the I950S , were Jewish. 176 There was an obvious reason for this de-
velopment. The white-shoe New York firms still discriminated q uite 
explicitly against Jews, forcing many bright Jewish law school gradu-
ates to look elsewhere for jobs. Given that bankruptcy was a rela-
tively sophisticated practice, and one that did not exclude J ews, it was 
an obvious choice. 
Unlike the elite Wall Street lawyers of Douglas's d ay, then, the 
bankruptcy lawyers that Countryman encountered were themselves 
outsiders in the legal profession. One can easily imagine why a scholar 
who had risked his academic career to defend outsiders would be 
sympathetic to a bar whose leaders also had faced exclusion. In both 
instances, the reason for persecution may have been the same - many 
observers suspect that anti-Semitism played a role in the loyalty prose-
173 See, e.g., id. at 238 (memorandum of the National Bankruptcy Conference, represented by, 
among others, Vern Countryman, vice-chair). 
174 In criticizing loyalty tests for lawyers in 1953, for instance, Countryman pointed out that 
"with very few exceptions, these tests have been imposed by, or at least at the instance of, the bar 
itself." Countryman, Loyalty Tests, supra note 9, at 149. He complained that "in this instance the 
hysterical men [calling for loyalty tests] have had the full support of the American Bar Associa" 
tion." !d. 
175 I have described this transition in detail elsewhere. See Skeel, supra note 6r. 
176 See generally Leonard M. Rosen & Jane Lee Vris, A History of the Bankruptcy Bar in the 
Second Circuit, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION LAW IN 
THE COURTS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF THE UNITED STATES 155, r8r (United States 
Courts for the Second Circuit Committee on History and Commemorative E vents ed., 1995) (re" 
ferring to the growth of the "smaller, predominently [sic] Jewish firms specializing in bank" 
ruptcy"). 
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cutions, the defendants of which were often Jewish, m just as it did in 
shaping the bankruptcy bar. 
A second factor tying Countryman to the bankruptcy bar may have 
been the doctrinal bent in his scholarship. Douglas was by nature a 
visionary who had little in common with the doctrinally oriented 
scholars of his time, such as Harvard's James McLaughlin. Although 
Douglas could adapt his mind to careful doctrinal analy·sis when nec-
essary, his heart lay in idol-smashing reform. Countryman, by con-
trast, fo und doctrinal analysis far more congenial. 17 8 Even his ac tiv-
ism in the loyalty cases was firmly grounded in arguments based on 
constitutional doctrine, given the goal of persuading courts to acquit 
the defen dants. In his affinity for doctrinal analysis, Countryman had 
much more in common with the practicing bar than did Douglas. 
Third, at an important juncture in his career, Countryman himself 
left academia to become a practicing lawyer. After he resigned from 
Yale in 1955, Countryman joined the Washington, D.C. law firm of 
Shea, Greenman & Gardner as a partner, and pursued private practice 
for the next four years. This stint as a practicing lawyer brought him 
into close contact with the bar, and it was during this time that Coun-
tryman began his formal involvement in ABA activities. Both Coun-
tryman and the National Bankruptcy Conference figured prominently 
on the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, which set the reform 
process in motion in the early 1970s, and both made frequent appear-
ances at subsequent legislative hearings. 
F inally, during Countryman's career the most prominent bank-
ruptcy lawyers - particularly those associated with the National 
Bankruptcy Conference - were unusually interested in promoting re-
form . To be sure, these lawyers stood to benefit, and did benefit, from 
the changes eventually wrought by the 1978 Code. But the principal 
motivation for many was a deep commitment to internal reform - to 
cleaning up the disreputable aspects of bankruptcy practice. 179 
1i i S ee !<.ALMAN, supra note 134, at 132. 
1 iS Prior to Countryman, doctrinal bankruptcy schola rship was often viewed as conservative in 
nature. Countryman was arguably the first scholar to wed the doctrina l approach with unmis-
takably progressive instin cts . This combination is now so pervasive that, in a recent account of 
the debates between progressives and law and economics-oriented bankruptcy scholars, Douglas 
Baird re fers to the progressives, without irony, as "traditiona lists." S ee Douglas G. Baird, Bank-
ruptcy's Uncon tested Axioms , 108 YALE L.J 573, 57 6 lrgg8). 
1 i9 For a brief description of the bar's campaign to reform bankruptcy law, see Rosen & Vris, 
cited above in note q 6, at 182-85. The reformers' principal concern was to alter the role of the 
bankruptcy judge, so that judges no longer performed both administrative and judicia l functions. 
Many observe rs believed that judges' in volvement in administrative procedures such as the initial 
creditors' meeting made it impossible for them to render truly objecti ve rulings when judicial is-
sues arose. For an important discussion of the concerns with the then existing approach by a 
leader in the reform effort, see George M. Treister, Bankruptcy Jurisdi ct ion: Is it Too Surmnary? , 
39 S. CAL. L. REV. 78 , 85 - 90 (rg66), which discusses perceived conflicts of interest. 
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In retrospect, it is difficult to determine which of the factors I have 
noted are causes , and which are effects, of Countryman's ties to the 
bankruptcy bar. Perhaps Countryman would have become a member 
and an ally of the National Bankruptcy Conference even if he had 
never resigned from Yale and entered private practice. Perhaps his 
doctrinal bent was a result of, rather than a bas is for, his affinity for 
the ba r. Whatever the sequence, the important point is that Country-
m an clearly vie\ved the practicing bar as fri end rather than foe. In 
this respect, as in his focus on personal bankruptcy, Countrym an 
charted a very different course from the one that Douglas had taken. 
J. The Rise of Law and Economics. A fin a l development marking 
the transition from Douglas to Countryman is the emergence of the 
law and economics movement in the 1970S. T he early law and eco-
nomics movement was instrumentalism wri t large. Law and econom-
ics scholars assume that individuals tend to pursue their own self-
interest and will alter their behavior in response to legal rules. Ac-
cording to these scholars, legal rules should be designed to promote the 
efficient allocation of resources. In bankruptcy, the earliest law and 
economics analyses suggested that lawmakers could counteract the 
surge in personal bankruptcy filings by reducing the amount of prop-
erty that debtors could exempt from creditors. Making bankruptcy 
less generous, the reasoning went, would discourage debtors from dis-
charging their obligations. 1so 
With its emphasis on instrumentalism, law and economics pursues 
a theme that dates back to Douglas and other early legal realists. Re-
cent progressives have almost universally rejected the law and eco-
nomics approach, ho·wever. These scholars criticize law and economics 
analysis for relying on simple but unsubstantiated assumptions about 
the behavior of debtors and others. 181 Because law and economics 
scholarship does not account for the intricate factual context in which 
actual debtors and creditors interact, its conclusions are inherently 
suspect. 
Although law and economics entered the bankruptcy literature late 
in his career, Countryman shared the skepticism of current progres-
sives toward its methods and simplistic prescriptions. An exchange 
between Countryman and Douglas that dates back to the earliest years 
180 S ee, e.g., William H. Mec kling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of 
th e State, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS . 13, 2 7 (1977) ("Chan ges in bankruptcy law which lower 
the costs or raise the benefits to debto rs of one of [the bankruptcy or informal settlement options] 
. . . will wi thout question in crease ... the total number of debtors who el ect [that option]."). 
181 For example, Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren , and J ay Lawrence \Nestbrook have 
complained that to Meckling and other early economics-based schola rs, the "bald assertion that 
manipulating the laws would produce predictable effects in debtor behavior . . was evidently so 
obvious as to require no empirical substantiation." SULLIVAN, WARRE N & WESTBROOK, supra 
note 82 , at 232 . 
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of Countryman 's career foreshadows much of the hostility that pro-
gressive scholars have for the reductive, and often poli tically conserva-
t ive, tendencies of law and economics scholarship. After returning 
fro m a 1948 visit to the U niversity of Chicago , whose Aaron Director 
is considered by some as the fathe r of law and economics, Countryman 
did not mince his words: 
I 'm a fraid I don ' t sha re your h igh opinion of t he p lace 1 8 2 In m y judg-
m ent it's nothing but a n indoct r ina t ion sc hool a nd the doc trine w hich it 
sell s is the class ical econom ic theory· of H enry Sim on as expou nded by h is 
successor, Aaron Director. My objec tion is not so m uch t hat I cons ider it 
poor doctrine - w hich I do - a s th at everyo ne at C hicago seems tn 
p reach it. 183 
During his years at H arv cm:J Law School, Countryman witnessed 
firsthand the rise and increasi ng dominance of law and economics in 
ba nkruptcy scholarship. The pioneering influence was Thomas J ac k-
son , a young Stanford law professor who employed law and economics 
m ethodology in his "creditors' bargain " theory of bankruptcy law. 18 4 
As articulated by Jackson and his frequent co-author, Douglas Baird , 
and applied to a wide range of bankruptcy issues , the creditors' bar-
gain theory argues that the goal of bankruptcy is to provide a collec-
tive solution to financial distress. By forcing creditors to halt their in-
dividual collection efforts, bankruptcy law prevents them from 
engaging in a "race to the courthouse," with creditors dismembering a 
potentially viable firm in their zeal to collect wha t the debtor ovves 
them. Bankruptcy should not do more than this , however. In par-
ticular, bankruptcy should not alte r nonbankruptcy law except to the 
extent necessary to facilitate an orderly, collective insolvency proceed-
ing. According to Baird and Jackson, deviations from nonbankruptcy 
law for other purposes would lead to costly, inefficient jurisdictional 
battles between parties who fare better in bankruptcy and those who 
prefer their entitlements under state law. By the mid-rg8os, the credi-
tors ' bargain model dominated bankruptcy discourse. In I g86 , an-
other prominent law and economics scholar announced in a review of 
Baird 's and J ackson 's bankruptcy casebook that the creditors ' bargain 
182 Douglas 's optimism about the U nive rsity of C hicago Law Sc hool was based on his friend-
ship with Robert Hutchins, a ferve nt legal realist w ho left Ya le to become President of the U ni-
versity of Chicago in 1929 . 
183 Lette r from Vern Countryma n to \Nilliam 0. Douglas (Oct. 28 , 1948) (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress, Douglas Files, Co nta iner No. I I r8). 
184 J ac kson first articulated the creditors' bargain theory in T homas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, 
N on-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and th e Crediton' BG1·gain, 91 YALE L.J. 85 7, 859-7 r (r 982). H e 
co-a uthored several subsequent ela borations of the theory wit h D ouglas Baird, see, e.g., Douglas 
G. Bai rd & Thomas H. Jackson, Co1·porate R eorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Owner-
ship Interests: A Comment on Adequate Pm tec tion of S ecured Crediton in Bankruptcy, 5 I U. 
C HI. L. REV. 97 (r984), and eve ntua lly published the analysis a_<; a book, THOMAS H . J ACKSON, 
T HE L OGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRU PTCY LAW (1<:)86) 
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theory had "set the terms of the scholarly debate for the next dec-
ade. "18 5 Although other scholars grumbled, 186 law and economics had 
become, and has remained, the most prominent methodology in bank-
ruptcy scholarship. 
T he creditors' bargain model embodies precisely the characteristics 
that Countryman had complained about in his let ter to Douglas dec-
ades earlier. Baird and Jackson assume, for example, t hat creditors 
operate in competitive credit markets and th at changes in b ankruptcy 
law will therefore have a direct effect on both thei r w illingness to ex-
tend credit and the interest rates they charge - otherwise, it would 
not be so important that bankruptcy law replicate nonbankruptcy law. 
Baird 's and J ackson's confidence in market forces comes straight from 
t he classical economics that Countryman had criticized after his visit 
to the University of Chicago. Countryman remained deeply skeptical 
of these kinds of arguments, and their reliance on theory rather than 
empirical data, throughout his career. In one of his last publications, a 
I 985 article on preferential transfers, Countryman took direct aim at 
Baird and Jackson, both of whom were participants in the symposium 
for which he wrote the article. The theoretical approach of Baird, 
J ackson, and other law and economics scholars to an issue like prefer-
ential transfers, Countryman complained, was inadequate: 
[The assumptions of these scholars leave them] free from the burden of 
scrutinizing the vast judicial output that reveals how the current prefer-
ence law is being administered - a subject in which they evince little in-
terest. . . . I confess to sharing the reaction of Professor Richard Mark-
ovitz after he had listened to another preacher of the true gospel. H e 
suggested that the answer to the question, "How many Chicago econo-
mists does it take to change a lightbulb?" was: "None. If it needed 
changing, the market would have changed it alre ady' '18 7 
Countryman's views on the Harvard Law School appointments 
process provide additional evidence that his hostility toward law and 
economics analysis did not mellow over time. After Thomas Jackson 
spent one year as a visiting professor at H arvard from I 985 to r 986, 
the law school voted to give him a permanent position. By all ac-
counts , Countryman fiercely opposed the appointment. 188 Country-
man viewed law and economics as a pernicious influence on policy de-
bates in bankruptcy, and he refused to support the scholar whose work 
!85 Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. 
R EV. 6go, 692 (I g86). 
186 S ee, e.g., Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note I 14, at 8 1 I- I 2 (quoting this claim and sug-
ges ting that law and economics analysis, though "seductive," is misguided). 
187 Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy , 38 VAND. L. REV. 
713,827 (rg85) (citations omitted) . 
188 See, e. g., Telephone Interview with Maura Kelly, Assista nt to Vern Countryman (Nov. I 2 , 
1999). Jackson left Harvard to become Dean of the University of Virginia School of Law in rg88. 
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had played so central a role in bringing this methodology to bank-
ruptcy. 
Unlike Douglas, then, who had relied on instrumental assu:inptions 
in his own v;ork on personal and small business bankruptcies, Coun-
try:rHan strongly rejected the new instrumentalism. I explain b.:: lovv 
that this hostility to law and economics scholarship has become an im-
oortant element of the scholarship of Elizabeth '.Narren r:md oth e1· t::-
cen. t progressi·ves. 
B. ';{'r-acing the ThYeads to Cun-ent Progressi?Je ScholaYsh 
E a.cb of the factors that I consider - the emphasis on. 
than corporate bankruptcy, the close ties to the bankruptcy bar, 
t rte hostility to law and economics analysis - has come to defi ne 
prc•gressive bankruptcy scholarship. An important effect has been to 
displace several elements of the early progressive vision of bankruptcy, 
and to produce the surprising differences between the work of 'William 
Douglas and that of Elizabeth Warren and other recent progressives. 
This section considers how each of the characteristics emphasized in 
the previous section manifests itself in the work of \Narren and other 
current progressives. 
The parallels between Countryman and Warren are most obvious 
in their shared emphasis on personal bankruptcy. For both, the bete 
noire is the consumer credit industry, and its efforts since the r g6os to 
force more debtors to make payments under a rehabilitation plan 
rather than receive an immediate discharge. In response to the credit 
industry's calls in the r g6os for stricter bankruptcy laws, Countryman 
argued that creditors' standards for issuing credit were far too lax. 189 
Subsequent progressive scholars continue to sound these themes, and 
to argue that debtors' access to the bankruptcy discharge must be pro-
tected. 
T his emphasis on personal bankruptcy has had an important indi-
rect effect on progressive scholars' views of corporate bankruptcy. As 
described in the last section, Countryman's passion for personal bank-
ruptcy caused him to de-emphasize his stance on corporate bankruptcy 
issues. In response to the increasing importance of corporate bank-
ruptcy in recent years, subsequent progressives have shown much 
more interest in this area, and many seem to have projected their 
vievvs on personal bankruptcy into the corporate context. :Much as 
they emphasize the fresh start for individual debtors, current progres-
sives similarly insist that corporations should be reorganized rather 
139 See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 68, at s-6 ("[T]here is evidence ... that institutional credit 
extenders will often overcommit the debtor even when they have accurate credit [information)."). 
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than liquidated whenever possible. 190 P rogressive scholars have there-
fore applauded the cha nges \Vrought by the 1978 Code: its kinder, gen-
tler version of the absolute priori ty rule; its assumption that a debtor 's 
managers rather than a court-appointed trustee should continue to ru n 
the firm in bankruptcy; and its generous treatment of attorneys' fees. 
Although some progress ive scholars- notably, Elizabeth Warren191 -
have kept the d ifferences betwee n personal and corporate bankruptcy 
firmly in view, m any tend to trea t the two contexts as interchangeable. 
Insights carried over from person al bankrup tcy, and the commitment 
to a fresh start , fig ure prominently in progressive scholars' corporate 
bankruptcy analysis . Perhaps the most dramc.tic example of this 
blending of contexts is an article suggesting that corporate bankruptcy 
should be analogized to "group therapy."192 
On the second facto r, Countryman's affinity for the bankruptcy 
bar, Elizabeth Warren and other recent progressives have reta ined the 
close ties. Rather than challenging the bar, as Douglas did, current 
progressives closely ally themselves in policy debates with bankruptcy 
lawyers and organizations such as the N ational Bankruptcy Confer-
ence. If anything, recent progressives' commitment to flexible reor-
ganization rules may have strengthened the connection by removing an 
important source of conflict between the practicing bar and earlier 
progressives. Whereas Countryman at best tolerated the shift to 
Chapter r I , current progressives actively embrace the more malleable 
reorganization regime. 
With respect to the third factor, the rise of law and economics, cur-
rent progressives remain just as hostile as Countryman himself. In 
personal bankruptcy, this has meant a v igilant defense of the fresh 
start, at times to the exclusion of other perspectives. Gone is any seri-
ous suggestion that bankruptcy should be used instrumentally to shape 
debtors' behavior. T he occasional exceptions to this stance have a dis-
tinctly populist flavor. In defending the recent N ational Bankruptcy 
Commission, for example , Elizabeth Warren emphasizes that the 
190 S ee, e.g., GROSS, sup;·a note 22, at I29 (arguin g that "rehabi litation is facilitated by curtail-
ing creditors' options and is justified because debtor r~ habilitati on trumps creditor choice"); War-
ren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note I I 4, at 787 ("C hapte r I I of the Bankruptcy Code gives bank-
rupt businesses another opportunity to succeed .... [T]he revival of an otherwise failing business 
a lso serves the distribu tional in terests of many who are not technically ' creditors' but w ho have 
an interest in a business's conti nued existence.''). 
19 1 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 96, at 341 ("Consum er bankruptcy policy rightly conce rns itse lf 
with the fresh start in ways th at a re not nearly so pressing fo r corporate deb tors. . . . Analogies 
between the two may sometim es be ap t, but t he circumstances differ sufficiently to justi fy discrete 
policy discussions.'). 
192 Donald R. Korobkin, RehabilitGting Values: A Juri spmdence of Bankruptcy, 9I COLUM. L. 
REV. iii, 722 (I99 I). Korobkin characterizes corporate bankruptcy as "creating condi tions for a 
discourse in which values of participants may be rehabilitated into a coherent and informed vi-
sion of ... the enterp rise. " ! d. at 789. 
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Commission's proposals would curb abuses of the bankruptcy law by 
wealthy debtors while protecting more traditional debtors' fresh 
start.1 93 
In corporate bankruptcy, the influence of law and economics schol-
arship has given progressive scholars still another reason to defend a 
"fresh start," or reorganization-based, view of Chapter I I. Law and 
economics scholars, preoccupied \vith deterring inefficient behavior by 
de btors and their managers, tend to call for strict enforcement of credi-
tors' priority rights, even when this practice diminishes the likelihood 
of reorganization. 194 More recent i.v ork has taken this impulse further, 
and suggests that Congress should repl ace the current Chapter I I with 
market-driven, liquidation-based al ternati ves. 195 In response to this 
literature, which progressive scholars view as creditor-oriented and 
conservative, they have dug in their heels. They, along with the prac-
ticing bar, fiercely defend the existing framework. 
The methodological response of progressive scholars to the law and 
economics movement is at least as striking as their rejection of its pol-
icy recommendations. As law and economics pervaded the literature, 
an obvious response would have been to articulate a competing nor-
mative theory of bankruptcy. Rather than suggesting such a theory, 
however, several leading progressive scholars have focused on empiri-
cal work. The most prominent illustration is the extensive study of 
personal bankruptcy by Elizabeth Warren and her co-authors196 - a 
study that has led both to a second personal bankruptcy study197 and 
to an investigation of business bankruptcy.198 This focus on empirical 
work is very much in the spirit of Countryman's work. Countryman 
long emphasized the need for empirical data and criticized its absence 
in most law and economics scholarship. 199 Subsequent progressive 
193 See Warren, A Principled Appmach, supra note 122, at 491-506. 
194 The pioneering work in the 198os of Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson initiated this 
trend. Baird's and J ac kson's "creditors' bargain" model called for strict compliance with state 
law priority rules. See, e.g., J ACKSON, supra note 184; Baird & Jackson, supra note 184. 
195 Se e supra note III. The most recent analysis by law and economics sc holars focu ses on the 
possibility that firm s could devise their own bankruptcy rules by contract rather than depending 
entirely on state-supplied bankruptcy laws. See generally Alan Sc hwartz, A Contract Theory Ap-
p1·oach to Business Bankntptcy, 107 YALE L]. r8o7 , r8o8-o9 (1998) (developing a model of 
bankruptcy contract that could be adjusted to refle ct a debtor 's arrangements with subsequent 
creditors); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A R eply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE 
L]. 317 (offering a sustai ned critique of Sc hwartz 's model). 
196 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 82 . 
197 TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE 
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN FINANCIAL CRISIS (2000). 
198 See Warren & Westbrook, supra note So, at 1258 (describing their projected business bank-
ruptcy study). 
199 See generally SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 82, at 265 n.8 ("Vern 
Countryman is another scholar who has long lamented the absence of useful data in the bank-
ruptcy area and who has been wary of economic models with no data to back them up. "). 
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scholarship continues the critique, seeking to remedy the lack of em-
pirical data. 200 
In sumrnary, current progressive scholars fo llovv Vern Country-
man's cues in each of the areas that I consider. They continue to place 
particular emphasis on personal bankruptcy; they have retained close 
t ies to the bankruptcy bar; and they continue to criticize the 'ivork of 
law and ewnomics scholars. In personal bankruptcy, these positions 
have inspired a :redoubled commitment to debtor protection 2.nd a dis-
taste for proposa.ls that a re designed to shape debtor b;::havior. Both of 
these commitments closely parallel Countryman's O\'o'Tl vie >;;,rs. In cor-
pora i:e bankruptcy, by contrast, current progress.l /c scholars take a 
ve:cy di. fferen t. stance than Countryman doe:s , '\Nhen=:as CountryTnan 
continued to defend SEC oversight and strict enfo:ccer.nent of the ab-
solute priority rule , his successors embrace the fa.r rnore flexible regime 
embodied in Chapter r r. 
T he evolution from Douglas through Countryman to ·warren and 
the present has taken progressive bankruptcy scholarship far from the 
concerns of earlier progressive scholars. The question that remains is 
what to make of these developments. 
III . TWO STORIES ABOUT THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY 
As we have seen, the course of progressive bankruptcy scholarship 
m the past seventy years provides a vivid illustration of the influence 
that one generation of scholars exerts on the next. Almost as intrigu-
ing as the threads that link Douglas to Countryman, and Countryman 
to ·warren and other current progressives, is the fact that progressive 
thinking seems, in some respects, to have reversed its course. The 
work of Vern Countryman serves as a pivot point between William 
Douglas and the sometimes different concerns of progressives today. 
This Part attempts to make sense of these developments. I argue 
that, in both personal and corporate bankruptcy, one can tell two sto-
ries about the evolution of progressive scholarship. On the one hand, 
the optimistic account suggests that progressive scholars have simply 
responded to changes in markets and other background institutions 
and that current progressives' vision of bankruptcy reflects the same 
core values as their predecessors held. The pessimistic story, on the 
other hand, worries that important concerns may have been lost, or at 
200 Progressive scholars have tended to rely on traditional empirical methods- such as the use 
by Sullivan , Warren, and Westbrook of data gathered from bankruptcy filing documents and in-
terviews- a strategy quite similar to William Douglas's earl ier approach. Law and economics 
scholars (and economists), by contrast, have focused on mathematical analysis of stock prices and 
other precisely quantifiable data. 
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traJ1slation of progressi·v~ fr on.1 one ge:n·· 
In the context of personal bankruptcy, I find the opti:tnistic story 
q uite compelling. Although the optimistic story also proves plausib le 
for corporate bankruptcy, the grounds for accepting the pessim.i.stic 
story appear st ronger. An important progressive critique s;::e:ms r.o 
have disapp.e:ared, and I outline what th at critique might look Eke if 
~;regressive scholars were to pick up that thread -- r ight vvhere ' l er:n 
C~ o·!..lntryrnarl left it. 
A. An OJ..?timistic View of Progressive Thinking 
on PeYsonal BankntJ.'ltcy 
The pessimistic story about progressive thinking on personal D ':1D.1~> 
nJ.ptcy w ould go something like this: in the beginning, the progressives 
developed a careful, nuanced view of the proper role of personal bank-
ruptcy. Although Douglas was wary of creditor overreaching and saw 
bankruptcy as a crucial safety valve for those in fi nancial distress, he 
also believed that bankruptcy law could be used to encourage fiscal re-
sponsibility on the part of future debtors. 202 A successful bankruptcy 
system would thereby diminish the need for bankruptcy relief. Over 
the years, progressive bankruptcy theory has lost its nuance. Many 
current progressives are so concerned with fending off the consumer 
credit lobby, and with protecting debtors' access to bankruptcy, tha t 
they have little to say about anything else. 
Although p rogressive thinking on bankruptcy does seem to have 
simplified its goals in some respects, the optimistic account offers a 
compelling explanation for this and other trends in current progressive 
scholarship . Part of the explanation lies in Douglas's work itself. Al-
though Douglas is widely rem~mbered as one of the most liberal Su-
p reme C ourt J ustices of the century, his early views on bankruptcy 
were in many respects quite conservative .203 Douglas's early work of-
ten focused less on reining in creditors than on influencing debtors ' 
behavior. G iven the increasingly important need to rein in creditors, it 
201 I have borrowed the term "translation" from Lawrence Lessig 's influential work in constitu-
tional law. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Unders tanding Changed Readings: Fideli ty and Theory, 4 7 
STAN. L. REV . 395 , 400-or (1995). 
202 See supra p. roSs . 
203 Some commentators have characterized Douglas's early academic stance as a strategy of 
calculated neutrality designed to further his academic ambitions. See, e.g., SIM ON, supra note rg, 
at ro8 ("[F]or Douglas the ambitious young assistant professor of law at Yale, pushing ha rd for 
promotion and recognition in his field of comm~rcial law, t he restraint was not surprising."). My 
own conclusion is that Douglas's writings accurate ly reflected h is views in the early I9J OS. It is 
worth noting in this regard that, as reform-minded as it was, the Progressive political movement 
of t he early r goos was itself con se rvative in many essential respec ts. See GABRIEL KOLKO, THE 
TRICMPH OF CONSERVATISM 2 (rg67). 
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is not surprising that subsequent progressive scholarship has sought to 
shift the balance. 20 4 
In addition, the concerns that Vern Countryman and subsequent 
progressives have voiced about the consumer credit industry reflect 
important changes in the consumer credit market. Consumer credit 
has exploded in recent decades, and the success of the consumer credit 
industry's massive lobbying effort in the past several years attests to its 
enormous power. 205 1\!Ioreover, since the late rg(os, when credit card 
interest rates were effectively deregulated, consumer creditors have 
moved down the economic ladder, lending to consumers with lower 
and lower incomes. 206 One can debate, of course, whether these devel-
opments should be facilitated, rei ned in, or left alone. In the optimistic 
story, progressives have increased their emphasis on protecting debtors 
as creditors' clout has increased and as potentially vulnerable, lower-
income debtors have become an important part of the credit economy. 
There are also grounds for optimism in the positive content of cur-
rent progressive scholarship. Although current progressive scholars 
sometimes seem to do little more than attempt to fend off the critical 
(and often pro-creditor) insights of law and economics, the empirical 
focus of leading progressive scholars provides an increasingly nuanced 
view of debtors and the bankruptcy framework. Progressive scholars 
have shed new light on the effect that local legal culture has on issues 
such as debtors' decisions whether to seek rehabilitation or an imme-
diate discharge.207 This work on local legal culture may provide valu-
able insights into the limits of legislative change.208 Recent progressive 
scholarship also focuses on important issues that did not figure promi-
nently in the work of Douglas and other early progressives, such as 
204 Vern Countryman's own writing is instructive in this regard. Although he referred on sev-
eral occasions to Wesley Sturges's pioneering work on consumer bankruptcy, see, e.g., Country-
man, supra note 68, at 6-8 (referring to Sturges as "a keen student of credit practices" and dis-
cussing Sturges's proposal for altering creditor default rights), Countryman rarely cited Douglas's 
scholarship in this area. 
205 See Warren, A PYincipled Appmach, supra note 122, at 486-88. 
Z06 For an extensive discussion of this phenomenon, see David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, 
The Rise of Consuma Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, OY Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3II, 
332-46 (I999). 
207 Important recent contributions include Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth vVarren & Jay Law-
rence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal CultuYe: 1'<-venty Yean of Evidencefmm the Fed-
em/ Bankruptcy Courls, I7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y Soi (I994), and Jean Braucher, LawyeYs 
and ConsumeY Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. SOI (I993), which 
documents variation among districts in the percentage of debtors who invoke Chapter 13 rather 
than Chapter 7, see id. at 502--03. 
208 For example, these variations in the percentage of debtors who seek rehabilitation rather 
than immediate discharge suggest that changes that give significant discretion to the bankruptcy 
judge -such as the 1984 amendment of Bankruptcy Code section 707(b) authorizing judges to 
prohibit a debtor's use of Chapter 7 if it would be a "substantial abuse," I I U.S. C. § 707 (I 994)-
will do little to alter current patterns in debtors' choice between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. 
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questions of race, gender, and e:thnicity, and how they relate to bank-
ruptcy. In their 1989 book, As }Ve Forgive OuY De btors, w·arren and 
her co-authors offer one of the first detailed considerations of the effect 
of bankruptcy on women. Their work indicates that single women 
w ho file for bankruptcy have much lo\ver incomes than single men 
and are unusually vulnerable to financial hardship even after bank-
ruptcy.209 In their for thcoming book, Warren and her co-authors con-
sider these and other demographic variables in more detaiP 10 As pro-
gress ive scholars continue to explore these issues, their insights should 
deepen our understanding of how financial distress varies across 
demographic groups and communities and how· Congress might reform 
the Bankruptcy Code to account for these factors. 
B . A New (and Old) Progressive Critique of Corporate Bankruptcy 
As I describe above, recent progressives have embraced an ap-
proach to corporate bankruptcy that is very similar to the bankruptcy 
regime that Douglas attacked. As with personal bankruptcy, the shift 
in attitude can be explained as a response to important changes that 
have occurred since the r 930s. 
An optimistic explanation for progressives' defense of existing prac-
tice is that the excesses Douglas and others railed against have been 
curbed. In the 1930s, Wall Street monopolized reorganization practice, 
to the detriment of small investors. New Deal financial reforms such 
as the Glass Steagall Act2 11 weakened the grip of J.P. Morgan and its 
peers on corporate finance. 212 Douglas and the SEC completed the 
project and ushered Wall Street out of corporate bankruptcy by in-
sisting that a trustee be appointed in large bankruptcy cases and pro-
hibiting the debtor's current bankers or lawyers from serving as trus-
tee or trustee's counseP 13 By the time Congress eliminated the 
mandatory trustee requirement in 1978, Wall Street had long since dis-
appeared from bankruptcy. With the practice no longer dominated by 
209 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBKOOK, supra note 82, at 147, IS I. Another prominent 
progressive, Karen Gross, devotes a lengthy review of As We Forgive Our Debtors to the boo k 's 
findings about women debtors and calls for further femini st inqui ry. See Karen Gross, R e-Vision 
of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REV. r so6, ISI0- 12 
(1990). 
210 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 197. 
211 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S. C. §§ 24, 78, 3 77-
78 (1994)) (repealed 1999). 
212 The most important recent di sc ussion of these developments is MARK ]. ROE, STRONG 
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
FINANCE (1994). 
213 As Douglas predicted in a letter to President Rooseve lt before the Chandler Act was en-
acted, "the reorganization study and in vestigation . . . is now cu lminating in a comprehensive 
legislati ve program which should go far towards carrying in to the reorganization field the high 
standards for finance which you have sponsored. " SIMON, sup1·a note 19, at rs6 . 
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a smaJl gro-up of elite Ia\v:iers, restorir1g ±1e}:ibillt~y to co:rriorate reo r·-
• • ' r-,'1 • ' 1 ' 1 • · • ~ gan1zat10n mach~ sense . 1 ne mterests ol small puotJ.c n.\\'estors llave 
also changed . ·whereas earlier investors generally purchased bonds 
and might benefit as credi tors from stric t enforcement of i:.he absolute 
priority rule, small investors now a re more likely to invest in stock -
and therefore will receive nothing in bankruptcy if the J.ov;~:st priority 
in terests are cut off. 
Other im portant legal changes further rei nforced the us·:;fulness o:f z:. 
±lexible reorganization framework . Perhaps the most dramatic of these 
changes \Vas the advent of mass torts, an issue that did no t exist in 
ea rlier generations. \Nith previously robust firms like John s lVIanville 
and A.H . Robins struggling under the crush of thousands of ]a\vsuits, 
it arguably was in all of the parties ' interests to deal with th~ problems 
in a single forum .214 Bankru ptcy emerged as the one forum that 
seemed to compensate victims, preserve the company's b usiness, and 
take other distributional issues into account. 
These, of course , are precisely the kinds of arguments th2J vVarren 
and other progressive schola rs make. They argue that current corpo-
rate bankruptcy law, with its sympathy fo r a debtor's managers and 
relaxed approach to creditors' priorities , is appropriately designed to 
reconcile the interests of a wide range of parties. 215 
The optimistic story has a powerful logic, but one can also make a 
strong case for a more pessimistic conclusion: progressive scholars 
have allied themselves too closely with the corporate bankruptcy bar. 
Although this sympathy for the bar is understandable, it is important 
to note how much the bar has changed since the push for b ankru ptcy 
reform in the I g6os. In the wake of the r 978 Code, the nation 's elite 
firms rediscovered bankruptcy; the most prominent bankruptcy law-
yers now work for many of the same big ci ty firms that domina ted 
corporate reorganization in the days of the early progressives.216 I n 
view of these changes, there may still be a need for aspects of the old 
p rogressive critique - the perspective passed down from D ouglas to 
Countrym an but left behind by current p rogressive scholars . 
21 4 Warren points out: 
W hen people spea k of the ni ghtma re of the John s Manville trust or the Eastern Airlines 
debacle, it is well to think of the d ebacle outside ba nkruptcy. No doubt some asbestosis 
claima nts would have collected big judgments in full , but at some point - a t the roo th 
claima nt, or the roooth, or the roo,oooth - M anville would have bee n out of money 
and the later victim s would have received nothing. 
\Va rren, Better Alternative, supm note 114, a t r 6. 
21 5 See, e.g., Warren, supra note 96, at 343- 44 (describing the goals of the b usiness bank ruptcy 
system with imp licit app rova l). 
21 6 S ee Rosen & Vris, supra note q 6, a t rs6 (noting that 49 of the so largest r·~ew York firms 
now desc ribe themselves as having bankruptcy expertise); id. at rSs (describin g the substantial 
bankruptcy p ractices of Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, Shearma n & Sterling, a nd W hite & Case). 
I 
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Consider the two benchmarks of the :;: 930s critique: ba:nker-la\.vye r 
coni1icts of :interest and the status of a debtor's managers in bank-
ri " 1\ ~ D l f l ' 1 bl' ~, ruptcy. . tw l~ew · ea re orms so vea tne most trou mg con!llcts 
problem by slamming shut the doors of bankruptcy on Wall Street. As 
corporate bankruptcy practices at large firms have expanded in recent 
years, ho•.vever, nevv conflicts of interest have emerged . Prominent 
lav;yers such as Harvey Miller are invohred in so :rnany of the leading 
cases that tney oft:::n have ties to parties wi th potentialiy adverse inter-
ests . In the Leslie Fay case, for instance, J'viiller 's finn, "Weil, Gotshal 
& ManE'·es , represented several significan t creditors , as well as the 
de btor, Leslie Fay. Because Weil , Gotshal never d isclosed the con±lict 
to the court , the bankruptcy judge required the firm to pay the 
$8oo,ooo cost of the investigation that rooted out the conflict. 21 7 
The progressive response to these concerns about confl icts of inter-
est has been surprisingly muted. During its deliberations on the cur-
rent Bankruptcy Code, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
initially adopted a proposal to weaken the Code's "disinterestedness" 
requirement for attorneys and only later reversed itself.2 18 If progres-
sive scholars were to take a vigorous stance on this issue 1 how might 
the critique look? 
The most obvious step would be for progressives simply to insist on 
strict cont1icts standards . Progressives might question, for instance, 
whether bankruptcy truly warrants more flexi ble standards than those 
used in other contexts . Even more interesting would be to focus on 
the institutional issue of who should be authorized to regulate the con-
flicts issue. T he conflicts problem could provide a valuable opportu-
nity to reverse one of the most remarkable effects of the I 9 7 8 bank-
ruptcy reforms, the dramatic scaling back of the SEC's role in 
corporate bankruptcy. 21 9 Before 1978, the SEC served as the principal 
representative of the interests of public investors in bankruptcy. The 
1978 Code culminated a long erosion of the SEC's role by sharply re-
stricting the SEC's int1uence. Since 1978, there has been only limited 
21 i See In re Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525 ,539 (Ban kr. S.D.N.Y 1994). 
21 8 The 1997 Commission initially proposed to amend the Bankruptcy Code's "disinterested-
ness" standard to preclude an attorney from representing the debtor only if she had a "material " 
conflict of interest. Fo r discussion of these events, see Todd J. Zywicki, !vi end It, Don't End [t: 
Th e Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requirement for Debtor in Possess ion's Profession-
als, r8 MISS. C. L. REV. 291 (rggS). For an argument defending more flexible standa rds, see Ger-
ald K. Smith, Standards for the Employment of Professio nals in Bankl-uptcy Cases: A Response to 
Professor Zywicki's Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requireme nt for Debto1· in Posses-
sion's Professionals, rS MISS. C. L. REV. 327 (rgg8). See also G. Ray Warner, Qf GYinches, Al-
chemy and DisinteYestedness: The Commission's Magically Disappem·ing Confl icts of Interest, 5 
AM. BANKR INST. L. REV. 423 (1997) (c riticizing the proposal to relax conflict of interest stan-
dards) . 
2! 9 For a detailed discussion of the Code's repudiation of the SEC and the New Deal vision of 
large· scale corporate reorganization, see Skeel , supra note 6 r. 
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governmental oversight in bankruptcyY0 By calling for SEC regula-
tion of the con±1icts problem, progressive scholars could encourage 
Congress to reinvigorate the role of government oversight on trouble-
some bankruptcy issues. 221 
As with bankruptcy attorneys, one can also imagine a v igorous 
progressive critique of the role of managers in the failure of large cor-
porations - especially given the \videspread concerns about manag-
ers' ability to use Chapter r r strategically. 22 2 Rather than defending 
current law, vvhich permits managers to continue to run the firm in 
bankruptcy, progressives might insist on close scrutiny of the rnanagers 
of a failing firm. (Criticism of managers' continued role \Vas, of 
course, a constant refrain of the SEC study overseen by VVilliam 
Douglas. 223 ) As an alternative to simply leaving managers in place, 
Congress could authorize the SEC to determine at the start of a case 
whether the firm's existing managers should be retained or replaced. 224 
Progressives might further call for Congress to limit managers' ability 
to use the bankruptcy process to derail derivative litigation against 
them. 225 
Progressive scholars could also take a much more aggressive stance 
on protecting employees. Surprisingly few progressives - a prominent 
exception being Vern Countryman himself22 6 - have insisted that em-
220 Under the I938 Chandler Act amendments, the court could not confirm a reorganization 
plan in a Chapter X case until the SEC had issued a report on the proposal. The I 978 Code left 
the SEC with little role in co rporate reorgani zation. See id. 
221 Thus, Congress migh t authorize the SEC to use its rulemaking process to develop conflicts 
rules. This delegation would diminish the ad hoc quality of the existing case law and would per-
mit an ongoing response to conflicts problems. The SEC might also play a useful role in regulat-
ing claims trading and related issues. 
222 The most prominent accounts (neither by legal academics) are DELANEY, supra note 103 
(strategic bankruptcy), and SOBOL, supra note 106 (the A.H. Robins case). I t is important to em-
phasize , however, that Chapter I I is not a picnic for the debtor's managers. Many manage rs are 
replaced before the end of the reo rgani zation process. See Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Bow·ds, 
Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control Wh en Finns 
Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 373-79 (1990). Nevertheless, managers clearly fare better in 
Chapter I I than under prior law. 
223 See supm pp. I089-90. 
224 Regulators have precisely this authority in bank and insurance inso lvency cases (w hi ch are 
not governed by the Bankruptcy Code). In both contexts, there is a strong presumption that 
managers should be removed. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § I83 1o(f)(2)(F)(ii) (I994). Progressives might 
call for a similar but less draconian approac h in bankruptcy. 
225 Existing bankruptcy law sharply limits the effectiveness of derivative litigation alleging that 
a debtor's managers have breached their fiduciary duties. Plaintiffs' attorneys who have brought 
litigation against the managers before bankruptcy, for in stance, ofte n abandon the litigation due 
to the procedura l obstacles posed by bankruptcy law. I have disc ussed these problems at length in 
other work. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Cm·porate Law and Co1·porate 
Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 4/I, 498-5 06 (I994). 
22 6 See Douglas Bordewieck & Vern Countryman, Th e R ejection of Collective Bargaining 
Ag,-eements by Chaptn II Debtors, 57 Aivi. BANKR. L.J. 293, 299-300 (1983). 
• 
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ployees' collective bargaining rights should be fully protected in bank-
ruptcy. (lVIany, including Elizabeth Warren , suggest that these rights 
should be balanced against other concerns.ZZ 7) In addition to collective 
bargaining rights, progressives might explore other protections for em-
ployees. One intriguing possibility, which Pennsylvania has adopted in 
the corporate anti takeover context, is mandatory "tin pa rachute" pro-
visions that would protec t employees laid off shortly after a firm's re-
organization. 228 
An obvious response to these suggestions - closely paralleling ar-
guments that progress ive scholars have made in the corporate law con-
text - is that the best way to protect employees and investors is by 
promoting teorganization , even if this approach incidentally benefits 
corporate managers and the bankruptcy bar. Leaving managers of 
troubled firms in place encourages them to invoke bankruptcy, for in-
stance, and smooths the way to reorganization. The reorganization in 
turn benefits employees and others because it keeps the firm in busi-
ness. 229 
Although this is a plausible defense of current progressive thinking, 
it is far from conclusive. First, it is hardly certain that the proposals I 
suggest, such as closer scrutiny of managers and greater protection of 
employees, would seriously interfere with reorganization . M oreover, 
progressives have traditionally taken the view that shifting the balance 
of power away from managers and toward employees is important 
enough to justify any chilling effect.230 
227 See Warren, Bankmptcy Policy , supra note r q, a t 792 ("[T jhe Code suggests tha t the dis-
tr ibutional aim of bankruptcy should be tai lored to the facts of the case - permit ting impai rme nt 
of labor contracts if it is esse ntial fo r a successful reorganizatio n and rejecti ng it if it is not. "). 
228 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2581 - 83 (1995). T he Pen nsylvania provisions provide compensation 
for emp loyees who are laid off within six months of a takeove r. To be effective in a subsequent 
bankruptcy, such provisions would need to be given priority status. 
22 9 Corporate law progressives have made similar arguments in defen se of antitakeover statutes 
such as "other consti tuency" provisions that permi t the managers of a firm tha t is the target of a 
takeove r bid to consider factors other than stoc k value in decidi ng whether to reject t he bid. Al-
though these provisions strengthen managers' hands, progressive sc holars see them as also bene-
fiting employees and the local community. See, e.g., Law rence E. Mitc hell , A Theoretical and 
Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency S tatutes, 70 T EX. L. REV. 579 (1992). 
Corpora te progressives also sha re with ba!lkruptcy progressives an increasing emphasis on com-
munita rian values. S ee GROSS, supra note 22 (bankruptcy); PROG RE SSIVE CORPORATE LAW 
(Law rence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
230 In the legislati ve hearings on the Chandler Act, fo r instance, William Douglas ignored law-
yers' com plaints that the mandatory trustee requirement would cause managers to avoid bank-
rup tcy at all costs. Only a strong measure, he maintained , would solve the problems with existing 
law. Douglas insisted that the involvement of an independent tru stee was "the keystone of th[e] 
program." R evision of the Bankruptcy Act: Hearing on H.R. 6439 Before the H ouse Comm. on 
the Ju d iciary , 75th Cong. 163-64, 175-77 (HJ37) (statement of William Douglas). 
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Second, and more interesting, the defense of current progressive 
thinking focuses on the time after a firm has filed for banl;c·uptcy.231 
i-\t this point, reorganization seems to benefit non-shareholder con-
stituencies because it keeps the firm afloat. Employees therefore keep 
their jobs, and the local community retains the benefits of the firm's 
presence. If one considers employees' perspective before the firm runs 
into trouble, however, the situation looks quite different. Bankruptcy 
ru les that punish managers and thus discourage bankruptcy ;n2,y c;.ctu-
ally give managers a povverful incentive to avoid financ ial diEic u.lty in 
the first instance. A manager who knows she vvill be removed in the 
event of bankruptcy is li kely to be more cautious v;hile the firm is 
}Jealthy than one who knows her control will contim1e. 232 ][ have 
shov.rn in detail elsewhere, this is precisely what we see in nations such 
as Germany and Japan, whose fi rms place a much greater ernphasis on 
employee job security and other non-shareholder interests than U.S. 
firms do. 233 Outside of the United States, stringent bankruptcy lavvs 
and progressive corporate law almost always go hand in hand. 
Let me emphasize that I am not trying to displace the current pro-
gressive view altogether. One can credibly argue that reorganization 
practice has been cleaned up and the world has changed so much since 
the r 930s that the early progressives' concerns simply do not apply in 
the same way. Yet it also seems clear that contemporary progressives' 
ties to the corporate bankruptcy bar, their grounding in perspectives 
taken from personal bankruptcy, and their academic battles with the 
law and economics movement figure prominently in their fierce loyalty 
to the reorganization framework established in 1978. This history sug-
gests that the current reorganization framework could benefit from a 
different progressive critique, one that sounds more like that of Wil-
liam Douglas and Vern Countryman. 
CONCLUSION 
Vern Countryman is a remarkable figure in twentieth-century legal 
academia generally and in bankruptcy in particular. He was anointed 
early on as the heir to William Douglas, the most important progres-
sive bankruptcy scholar of the century. Thereafter, he left his mark on 
every corner of bankruptcy theory and practice. Countryman's defini-
tion of an executory contract has served as the touchstone for numer-
23! Douglas Baird makes a somewhat similar point. See Baird, supra note I iS, at 589; see also 
Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. 
REv. r, r2-r4 (emphasizing the importance of ex ante effects). 
232 Somewhat counterintuitively, harsh bankruptcy laws tend to encourage relational govern-
ance outside of bankruptcy and a less market-driven approach to corporate law generally. See 
Skeel, supra note 30, at 1339-46. 
233 See id. 
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ous court dec isions and every subsequent academic discussion on the 
subject. N ot only was Countryman a charter member of the consumer 
protection movement, he also played a pivotal role in persuading the 
bankruptcy b:u to support, and Congress to adopt, important protec-
tions for consurners in bankruptcy. Countryman wrote a ground-
breaking bankruptcy casebook, participated prominently in the bar 's 
lecoding organizations , testified regularly before Congress, wrote briefs 
fo r importan ': cc.ses, and authored numerous influential articles. 
Underlying al l of Countryman's efforts \Vas a longstanding com-
mitment to liberties. Countryman's core values were evident 
from the b ::ginrti ng of hi s career, in his unyield ing support of the de-
fend:=mts in the Ioyalty cases of the I 950s. They also informed his per-
sistent carnpaign on behalf of consumer debtors . More than those of 
any other ac ademic, Vern Countryman's commitments have colored 
the thinking of current progressive bankruptcy scholars . Like Coun-
tryman, more recent progressives promote the interests of individual 
debtors and a broadly construed fresh start, often join forces with the 
bankruptcy bar, and resist the incursions of law and economics. I 
have argued that the progressive vision has been distorted in some re-
spects in its translation to the present. But this disconnect should not 
obscure the important continuities. Progressive theory has retained 
both its vitality and its influence in the work of Elizabeth Warren and 
other current progressives; and there is little question where , and from 
whom, their inspiration came. 
